Taylor v. Doe

Background

Deborah Taylor, Matthew Kramer, and Reem Taoz sued Jane Doe for defamation based on anonymous posts published on Medium. The plaintiffs alleged that the posts falsely accused them of participating in a scheme involving Spotify playlists and made other statements about their professional activities and careers in the electronic dance music industry.

The court had previously allowed the plaintiffs to subpoena Medium and internet service providers to identify Doe. Medium supplied internet protocol addresses, and Verizon was associated with one of those addresses. Verizon would not disclose subscriber information without a subpoena. Doe, described as a nonparty, moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 to quash the subpoena served on Verizon. She argued that disclosure would violate the First and Fourth Amendments and the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551. She also asked to proceed anonymously if she later became a party.

Motion to Quash

A court must quash or modify a subpoena that requires disclosure of protected information when no exception applies. The First Amendment protects anonymous speech, including speech on the internet, but that protection is not absolute. Courts balance the speaker’s anonymity interests against the need for discovery by applying five factors: whether the plaintiff has shown an initial actionable claim, whether the discovery request is specific, whether other ways of obtaining the information exist, whether the information is needed to advance the claim, and the speaker’s expectation of privacy.

The court held that all five factors favored disclosure.

First, the plaintiffs made a sufficient initial showing of a defamation claim under New York law. The court identified the required elements as a written defamatory statement about the plaintiff, publication to a third party, fault, falsity, and either special damages or a statement actionable without proof of specific damages. The court accepted the plaintiffs’ allegations at this stage and emphasized that it was not deciding whether the complaint would survive a motion to dismiss or whether the plaintiffs would ultimately prevail.

Second, the subpoena was sufficiently specific because it sought identifying information for users associated with the IP addresses identified in the subpoena. Third, the plaintiffs had no practical alternative for identifying Doe because their investigation had traced the address to a virtual private data network. The court rejected Doe’s suggestion that the plaintiffs investigate an anonymous Twitter account because Doe had not connected that account to the defendant.

Fourth, the information was necessary because the plaintiffs could not serve Doe or continue the litigation without identifying her. Fifth, the court found that Doe had little expectation of privacy under the circumstances. Verizon’s terms and privacy policy allowed disclosure of subscriber information in response to valid legal process, and the court also rejected Doe’s Fourth Amendment argument.

The court further ruled that Doe’s concern that the identifying information might produce a false match concerned her potential liability, not whether the subpoena was proper. It also found that the plaintiffs’ arguments concerning Doe’s attorney were inappropriate and irrelevant, but concluded that those arguments did not affect the subpoena because the plaintiffs had independently shown the information’s relevance and necessity.

The court held that the Telecommunications Act did not bar disclosure because the statute permits disclosure pursuant to a court order when the subscriber is notified. The court found that Doe had been notified of the subpoena.

Request to Proceed Anonymously

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) generally requires a complaint to name all parties. The court said that whether a party may proceed anonymously depends on balancing that person’s interest in anonymity against the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the opposing party.

Doe argued generally that her identifying information should be protected. She also stated that she feared having her personal information made public after her identity and $50,000 from her bank account were stolen in 2017. The court found that these general privacy concerns did not outweigh the public interest in disclosure, assuming Doe was later named as a party. The court did not address allegations that her amended declaration may have been backdated because those issues had no effect on the rulings.

Disposition

The court denied Doe’s motion to quash and denied her request to proceed anonymously. Verizon was permitted to provide the plaintiffs with Doe’s personal identifying information associated with IP address 72.89.153.31. If Doe was later named as a party, the court stated that she would proceed under her real name. The plaintiffs were ordered to file an amended complaint naming Doe by August 12, 2021, and to serve her by September 10, 2021.