Dinkins v. The State of New York

Background

Nicos L. Dinkins, proceeding without a lawyer, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law against Town of Ramapo Police Officer Michael Samora based on an arrest on November 27, 2018. Dinkins alleged that Samora used excessive force, conducted an unreasonable search, engaged in racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and harassed him under New York law.

The County Defendants—Petranker, Rockland County Sheriff Falco, and Rockland County Executive Ed Day—had already been dismissed from the action. They later moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of a final judgment as to them. Samora separately moved for summary judgment under Rule 56, which allows judgment without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Arrest and Convictions

Police responded to a report of a suspicious vehicle parked near a residence. Samora asked the occupants for identification. Dinkins falsely said that he had no identification and identified himself as Travis Mann. According to Samora, he learned that Mann had an outstanding warrant, called for backup, and pursued Dinkins after Dinkins ran away. Samora said he fired a taser once but missed and that Dinkins surrendered.

Dinkins gave a different account. He said Samora advanced toward him, causing him to flee, fired the taser at least twice, struck him with the second shot, and beat him after he was handcuffed. Samora recovered a wallet containing Dinkins’s valid driver’s license, a forged driver’s license bearing Dinkins’s picture in the name of William Cooper, and three fake credit cards issued to William Cooper.

A grand jury indicted Dinkins, and a trial jury convicted him of four counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The opinion states that those convictions had not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise disturbed.

Unreasonable-Search Claim

The court did not reach the merits of Dinkins’s unreasonable-search claim. It applied the rule from Heck v. Humphrey, which generally bars a damages claim under § 1983 when success on that claim would necessarily imply that an existing criminal conviction is invalid, unless the conviction has already been overturned or otherwise invalidated.

The court found that Dinkins’s search claim concerned the wallet and its contents—the same evidence underlying his four convictions. Because allowing the claim to proceed would necessarily imply that those convictions were invalid, the court held that the claim was barred by the Heck doctrine and granted Samora summary judgment on it. The court also expressed skepticism that a constitutionally protected search had occurred because Dinkins appeared to have abandoned the wallet, but it did not rely on that issue as the basis for its ruling.

Excessive-Force Claims

Dinkins asserted three excessive-force theories: use of a taser, use of handcuffs, and a beating after he was handcuffed.

For the taser claim, the court assumed Dinkins’s account was true for purposes of the motion: that Samora fired at least twice and hit him with the second shot. The court nevertheless concluded that the use of the taser was objectively reasonable under the circumstances because Samora believed Dinkins was a wanted person, Dinkins had tried to avoid identifying himself, and Dinkins fled. The court also noted that Samora warned Dinkins several times to stop running or he would use the taser. The court granted summary judgment on this theory. It additionally noted that the medical records did not record an injury from being tased.

For the handcuff claim, Dinkins reported wrist soreness and had an abrasion. The court applied factors concerning whether the handcuffs were unreasonably tight, whether the officer ignored complaints that they were too tight, and the seriousness of the wrist injury. The court found no evidence that the handcuffs were too tight, that Dinkins complained about them, or that the injuries were more than minor. It dismissed this theory of excessive force.

For the alleged beating after handcuffing, the court found that Dinkins provided no specific account or evidence describing what Samora did. The court also found that the medical records—showing knee and wrist pain, a wrist abrasion, and a knee strain treated with medication—did not support his general description of a severe beating. The court dismissed this theory as well and granted Samora summary judgment on the excessive-force claim in its entirety.

Racial-Profiling Claim

Dinkins claimed that his arrest and prosecution resulted from racial profiling under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The court explained that this claim required evidence of intentional racial discrimination, not merely a disproportionate effect.

The court found that Dinkins offered only unsupported and speculative assertions. Because those assertions were not enough to create a genuine factual dispute, the court granted Samora summary judgment on the racial-profiling claim.

New York Harassment Claim

Dinkins’s remaining state-law claim alleged harassment. Samora argued that Dinkins had not complied with the applicable notice-of-claim requirement, and Dinkins said he had filed a notice but did not provide supporting evidence.

The court did not need to resolve the notice issue. It held that New York law does not recognize an independent tort for harassment and dismissed the claim.

Rule 54(b) Motion and Disposition

Because the court granted Samora summary judgment on all claims against him, it concluded that the case would ordinarily be dismissed in its entirety and that a judgment would be entered for all defendants. The court therefore denied the County Defendants’ Rule 54(b) motion as moot.

Judge Philip M. Halpern’s final disposition was to grant Samora’s motion for summary judgment and deny the County Defendants’ motion for entry of a final judgment as moot. The Clerk was directed to enter final judgment in favor of all defendants and close the case. The court stated that it did not need to reach Samora’s qualified-immunity argument.