The Center for Medical Progress v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America

Background

The Center for Medical Progress (CMP) and David Daleiden sued Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) for defamation. The challenged statements appeared in a September 2019 Rewire News Group article and in a PPFA Twitter post following earlier California proceedings.

The plaintiffs had previously attended abortion-industry conferences using assumed names and false identification documents, secretly recorded conversations with abortion providers using hidden cameras, and released videos online. PPFA had sued CMP, Daleiden, and others in California, asserting claims including fraud, trespass, invasion of privacy, and civil racketeering. PPFA prevailed, and a jury awarded more than $2 million, including $870,000 in punitive damages. Daleiden and an associate also faced criminal charges in California concerning recording and related conduct.

The first challenged statement quoted a PPFA spokesperson as saying that Daleiden and the associate should face the legal consequences of a “multiyear illegal effort to manufacture a fake smear campaign against Planned Parenthood.” The second statement, posted by PPFA on Twitter after the California civil jury’s verdict, said that CMP, Daleiden, and others had “created a false smear campaign against Planned Parenthood” and had broken state and federal laws.

The plaintiffs alleged that these phrases accused them of creating or manufacturing false video footage and falsely reporting on PPFA. They claimed the statements were defamatory per se—meaning the alleged defamation was of a type that could support a claim without proof of specific financial loss—because the statements harmed their claimed profession of truthful investigative reporting.

Motion to Dismiss

PPFA moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Under New York law, a libel claim requires a written defamatory factual statement concerning the plaintiff, publication to a third party, fault, falsity, and either special damages or a basis for treating the claim as defamation per se.

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plead falsity, which is required for defamation. A statement is substantially true when it would not create a meaningfully different impression in a reader’s mind from the precise truth. The court relied on allegations in the complaint that the plaintiffs used false identities and documents, secretly recorded conversations, and released edited videos that spliced together noncontiguous statements and took statements out of context. The court also considered the California jury’s finding that Daleiden and CMP were liable for fraud and the resulting damages award.

The court concluded that the phrases “false smear campaign” and “manufactured a fake smear campaign,” read in context, described conduct that the plaintiffs themselves alleged and that the California proceedings addressed. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the phrases accused them of fabricating evidence. It found that the challenged statements did not say that the plaintiffs fabricated evidence and that a reasonable reader would not understand them that way in the context of the related articles and Twitter thread.

New York Civil Rights Law Section 74

The court also held that both statements were protected by Section 74 of the New York Civil Rights Law. That statute provides an absolute privilege for a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding. The protection can apply even when a report includes commentary or opinion, as long as the substance is substantially accurate.

The court found that the first statement appeared in an article reporting on the California criminal case and the denial of Daleiden’s motion to quash a search warrant. The second appeared in a Twitter post expressly referring to the civil jury’s verdict and linking to an article about that verdict. The court concluded that neither statement suggested conduct more serious than the conduct described in the underlying California proceedings.

Because the court found two independent grounds for dismissal—substantial truth and Section 74 privilege—it did not decide PPFA’s other arguments that the statements were opinions, that the plaintiffs were “libel-proof,” or that the plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded defamation per se.

Attorney’s Fees

PPFA mentioned potential attorney’s fees and costs under New York’s anti-lawsuit-against-public-participation statute, but it did not formally move for a fee award or brief the issue sufficiently. The court therefore did not award fees or costs in this order. It stated that PPFA would apparently need to pursue a separate lawsuit to recover fees under the statute and noted that additional legal issues might affect any such request.

Disposition

Judge Colleen McMahon granted PPFA’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, directed the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the complaint, and directed the Clerk to close the case.