Dill v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Background

Harold R. Dill and Edward M. Appleby sued JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., asserting claims for conversion, negligence, negligence per se, and unjust enrichment on behalf of themselves and proposed classes. They alleged that they bought cashier’s checks from JPMorgan Chase using funds from their accounts, that the checks later became abandoned property covered by state and federal escheatment laws, and that JPMorgan Chase failed to comply with those laws or give proper notice.

JPMorgan Chase moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, relying on the arbitration provision in its Deposit Account Agreement. In the July 29, 2020 order, the Court granted that motion, found that the agreement’s arbitration provision was broad, concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims fell within its scope, and stayed the case as to Dill and Appleby while arbitration proceeded. The Court directed JPMorgan Chase to respond to the claims of Kari Garber, who had been added as a plaintiff. Garber and Laura Stanczyk later voluntarily dismissed their claims, and the Court denied JPMorgan Chase’s separate motion to dismiss as moot.

Motion to Certify an Immediate Appeal

The plaintiffs moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify the July 29 order for an interlocutory appeal, meaning an appeal before the case is fully resolved. Certification requires a controlling legal question, substantial grounds for disagreement about that question, and a finding that immediate review may materially advance the end of the litigation.

The Court denied the motion. It concluded that the arbitration ruling did not present a controlling question of law because reversing the ruling would return the case to the district court rather than end the action. The Court also concluded that the issue was not a pure legal question that could be decided without examining the agreement and the underlying record. The plaintiffs likewise failed to show substantial grounds for disagreement or that an immediate appeal would advance the litigation. The Court stated that an appeal would more likely delay arbitration and was inconsistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration.

Motion to Vacate or Reconsider

The plaintiffs separately sought to vacate the July 29 order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc. The Court treated the request as one for reconsideration under Rule 54(b), explaining that Rule 60(b) did not apply because the July 29 order was not a final judgment.

The Court held that reconsideration was not warranted. It found that Cooper v. Ruane involved a different, employment-related arbitration clause and did not establish that a broad arbitration provision like the one in JPMorgan Chase’s Deposit Account Agreement should be interpreted differently. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the later decision created a general test based on whether the dispute was foreseeable when the parties entered the agreement. The Court reaffirmed its earlier conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims were connected to the Deposit Account Agreement because they arose from their purchases of cashier’s checks using their accounts.

Disposition

The Court denied both of the plaintiffs’ motions. The stay imposed by the July 29 order remains in place pending further order of the Court. The parties were ordered to update the Court by November 5, 2021, about the status of any arbitration.