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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Aug. 10, 2021

de Lacour v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.

Judge
Kimba Wood
Docket
1:16-cv-08364
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
4
Civil ProcedureClass Action
In one sentence

In de Lacour v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Judge Wood denied the defendants’ motion to pause litigation while their class-certification appeal petition remained pending.

Who this affects

The ruling affected Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Tom’s of Maine Inc., which sought to pause the case, and the plaintiffs and certified consumer classes, whose litigation was allowed to continue while the appeal petition remained pending.

What happened

In de Lacour v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the court had certified three consumer classes involving Tom’s of Maine deodorant and toothpaste products in California, Florida, and New York. The defendants asked the court to pause the case while the Second Circuit considered their request for permission to appeal the class-certification order.

The court applied four factors for deciding whether to pause a case. It found that the defendants had not shown a strong likelihood that the Second Circuit would accept the appeal or that they would ultimately succeed. The defendants also had not shown irreparable harm; possible discovery expenses were not enough. The other two factors did not significantly favor either side.

Judge Kimba M. Wood denied the defendants’ motion to stay. The court directed the parties’ notice-plan and case-management submissions to be addressed in later orders.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
de Lacour v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. · No. 1:16-cv-08364
Judge
Kimba Wood
Date
Aug. 10, 2021

Background

On April 23, 2021, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court certified three classes consisting of consumers of Tom’s of Maine deodorant and/or toothpaste products in California, Florida, and New York.

The defendants later filed a petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) seeking permission to appeal the class-certification order. The petition raised questions about whether a settlement agreement in a prior case barred the plaintiffs’ claims and whether the plaintiffs had standing to represent toothpaste purchasers. While that petition was pending, the defendants moved to stay, meaning temporarily pause, the litigation. The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

Court’s analysis

The court considered four factors: whether the defendants were likely to succeed, whether they would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, whether a stay would substantially harm the other parties, and where the public interest lay. The court stated that the first two factors were the most important.

On likelihood of success, the court found that the defendants’ motion did not address whether the Second Circuit would grant permission to appeal. The court also found that the defendants had not adequately shown that they would ultimately succeed on their challenges to class certification.

Regarding the settlement issue, the court relied on its earlier conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims did not share an identical factual basis with the claims covered by the prior settlement and that the defendants had not made the required showing that the settlement defense applied to the named plaintiffs. Regarding class standing, the court previously determined that differences between toothpaste and deodorant ingredients were not decisive because, among other reasons, the alleged statement that the products were “natural” was the same across the products at issue and was made by the same defendants.

On irreparable harm, the defendants expressed concern that the parties would incur substantial discovery costs that might become unnecessary depending on the Second Circuit’s decision. The court held that litigation expenses, even substantial and unrecoverable expenses, do not constitute irreparable harm.

The court found that the third and fourth factors did not weigh heavily in either direction. It noted the defendants’ argument that any stay might be brief and that individual class members sought only modest damages. It also recognized the consumers’ and public interest in efficiently resolving the claims and compensating consumers if damages were owed.

Ruling

Because the two most important factors weighed against a stay, and the remaining factors did not materially change the analysis, Judge Kimba M. Wood denied the defendants’ motion to stay. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion at ECF No. 152. The court stated that the plaintiffs’ proposed notice plan and the parties’ case-management proposals would be addressed in separate forthcoming orders.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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