Lindberg v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.

Background

Greg Lindberg sued Dow Jones & Company, Inc., the owner of The Wall Street Journal, over two articles published in 2019. The first article reported that Lindberg had diverted $2 billion from insurance companies for his personal benefit and described related investments, political contributions, luxury purchases, and regulatory concerns. The second article described Lindberg’s alleged use of surveillance operatives to follow women and linked that conduct to questions about his use of insurance-company funds.

Lindberg asserted claims for defamation, tortious interference with contracts, and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty. Dow Jones moved to dismiss all of the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim.

Defamation Claims and Limitations Period

New York provides a one-year limitations period for defamation claims. The parties agreed that claims based on the second article, published October 3, 2019, were timely, but the first article was published February 28 and March 1, 2019—more than one year before Lindberg filed suit.

Lindberg argued that the second article republished the first article and therefore restarted the limitations period. The court rejected that argument. The second article referred to a February Journal investigation and included a hyperlink to the first article, but it did not repeat the first article’s allegedly defamatory statements. The court held that a reference or hyperlink, without restating the allegedly defamatory material, is not a republication. The court also held that the second article’s new information about Lindberg’s insurance companies did not republish the first article.

The court therefore held that Lindberg’s defamation claims based on statements in the first article were barred by the statute of limitations. The court separately observed that the statements in the first article concerned matters of public interest and would require allegations of actual malice even if they had been timely.

Actual Malice

Under New York Civil Rights Law § 76-a, a plaintiff bringing a defamation claim involving public petition and participation must establish actual malice. In this context, actual malice means that the challenged statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for whether they were false.

The court held that the second article’s discussion of a possible financial shortfall at Lindberg’s insurers concerned a matter of public interest because it implicated the insurers’ ability to pay claimants. The court also held that the article’s discussion of surveillance was sufficiently related to the public-interest issue of Lindberg’s alleged use of insurance-company assets for personal purposes. Accordingly, Lindberg had to plead actual malice for the challenged statements.

Lindberg did not argue that his existing allegations plausibly showed actual malice. He sought permission to amend, but did not submit a proposed amended complaint or explain what facts would establish actual malice. The court denied that request as presented, concluding that Lindberg had not shown that an amendment would cure the pleading deficiencies. The court also noted that some statements might fail because Lindberg did not allege they were false, and that the statement about a financial hole might ultimately be subject to a fair-report privilege, although the court did not decide that defense at this stage.

Tortious Interference and Aiding and Abetting

Lindberg alleged that former staffers and operatives disclosed information to the Journal in violation of confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements, and that Journal reporters interfered with those agreements. The court held that the complaint did not identify the relevant individuals, contracts, or specific contractual provisions. Those general allegations did not provide enough detail to identify which contracts Dow Jones allegedly interfered with.

Lindberg also alleged that the Journal reporters aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty. The court held that he did not plausibly allege that the unidentified sources owed him fiduciary duties. Describing a source as a former contractor or former employee, or alleging that a person possessed confidential information, did not establish the required relationship of trust, reliance, control, or dominance. The court further held that Lindberg did not plausibly allege that Dow Jones had actual knowledge of any contractual or fiduciary obligations. Allegations based on what investigative journalists might have known or should have known were insufficient.

Disposition

The court granted Dow Jones’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed Lindberg’s claims for tortious interference with contracts and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, and held that the defamation claims based on the first article were barred by the limitations period. The opinion also rejected Lindberg’s request to amend as presented, while allowing him to file a later motion for leave to submit an amended complaint, with the proposed complaint attached, by September 13, 2021. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan did not state that the dismissals were with prejudice or without prejudice.