Marrero v. Saul

Background

Luis Marrero sought review under the Social Security Act of the Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income. The opinion states that Dr. Kilolo Kijakazi was substituted for former Commissioner Andrew Saul as the defendant. Marrero alleged disability based on depression, anxiety, back, neck, and shoulder problems, and arthritis. An administrative law judge held a hearing at which Marrero and vocational expert Richard Hall testified. The administrative law judge concluded that Marrero was not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review, making that decision final.

The administrative law judge found that Marrero had severe impairments involving his cervical and lumbar spine, right shoulder, depression, and anxiety. She determined that his impairments did not meet or equal the listed impairments in the Social Security regulations. She assessed a residual functional capacity—the most he could do despite his impairments—for light work with restrictions, including limited climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, overhead reaching with the right arm, exposure to hazards, interaction with the public, and workplace changes. The administrative law judge found that Marrero had no past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.

Arguments

Marrero challenged the decision on four principal grounds. First, he argued that Hall’s job-number testimony was unreliable because Hall could not explain why his estimate for laundry-attendant jobs was much higher than the number shown in Job Browser. Second, Marrero argued that the residual functional capacity did not account for limitations on forward reaching, stress, staying on task, and maintaining a fixed schedule. Third, he argued that the administrative law judge failed to obtain medical records from St. Barnabas and The Connection. Fourth, he argued that the administrative law judge improperly relied on his daily activities, conservative treatment, and failure to comply with prescribed treatment in finding that he could perform light work.

Court’s Analysis

The court applied the substantial-evidence standard. Under that standard, the court does not decide disability anew; it asks whether relevant evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision and whether the correct legal standards were used.

Vocational-expert testimony. The court held that Hall’s testimony was substantial evidence supporting the administrative law judge’s step-five finding. Hall identified the general sources he used, including Bureau of Labor Statistics information, Job Browser, labor-market research, and his professional experience. The record also showed that Hall had extensive experience as a vocational counselor and had testified at Social Security hearings since 1988. Marrero’s counsel challenged Hall before and after the hearing and cross-examined him about his methodology. The court concluded that Marrero had not shown that the evidence prevented a reasonable person from finding that a significant number of suitable jobs existed.

Physical and mental limitations. The court rejected Marrero’s argument that the residual functional capacity needed an additional forward-reaching restriction. Although Marrero cited shoulder imaging, his hearing testimony, and a consultative examination, the court found that the other medical evidence did not establish a need for a greater reaching limitation. The court also rejected the challenge concerning stress, concentration, scheduling, and other mental limitations. It noted that the administrative judge considered Marrero’s mental-health complaints and included restrictions to simple, routine tasks, no work with the general public, and few workplace changes. Marrero did not identify additional evidence that the administrative judge overlooked or specific stressors that were not accommodated.

Missing medical records. The court found that the Social Security Administration had requested the St. Barnabas records several times. Marrero did not explain how those records would undermine the decision. The record did not show that the agency had tried to obtain records from The Connection, but the court held that any resulting error was harmless. Marrero did not explain why records concerning a 2017 head injury or mental-health treatment would materially affect the disability determination, particularly because he did not claim that his condition then differed from his condition during later treatment.

Daily activities and treatment history. The court held that the administrative judge could consider Marrero’s reported activities, including spending time outside, biking, cooking, cleaning, and using public transportation, as part of the overall evaluation of his symptoms and limitations. Conservative treatment alone could not support an adverse finding, but the administrative judge could consider it with other factors. The administrative judge could also consider Marrero’s noncompliance with physical therapy. The court emphasized that clinical findings, imaging, and treatment notes also contradicted the severity of Marrero’s alleged limitations, including findings of normal strength, gait, neurological function, and mostly stable back imaging.

Disposition

Judge Paul E. Davison denied Marrero’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion. The court upheld the administrative decision finding Marrero not disabled and directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motions and close the case.