Ramirez v. Temin & Company, Inc.

Background

Kaitlyn Ramirez sued Temin & Company, Inc. and Davia Temin under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, the New York Labor Law, and New York common law. She alleged race, color, national-origin, sex, and disability discrimination; retaliation; unpaid overtime; battery; and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Ramirez alleged that she was paid less than a white research assistant, required to perform cleaning and personal tasks, subjected to comments about her race, hair, clothing, and appearance, and treated differently from other employees. She also alleged that she was not paid for all hours worked above 40 per week, that the defendants did not provide requested accommodations for medical conditions, and that Temin struck her hand while she carried hot coffee. Ramirez resigned on September 20, 2019, after being removed from a project involving preparation for a sexual-harassment training.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. At this stage, the court accepted factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences for Ramirez, but did not accept legal conclusions or unsupported assertions.

Federal and New York State discrimination and retaliation claims

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s § 1981 race-discrimination claim. It concluded that she did not adequately allege an adverse employment action, meaning a materially significant change in the terms or conditions of employment. Her disparate-pay theory did not identify a sufficiently similar comparator: Galina Fendikevich had been hired earlier, later held a different position, and was an independent contractor. Ramirez also did not provide enough information about an unnamed employee whom she identified for the first time in her opposition brief.

The court also held that the alleged menial tasks, criticism, and coffee incident were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment under § 1981. In addition, the complaint did not adequately connect those events to racial animus. The court rejected the constructive-discharge theory because dissatisfaction with assignments, supervision, criticism, and removal from one project did not amount to conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. The § 1981 discrimination claim was dismissed without prejudice.

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s § 1981 retaliation claim. Her comment that a greater white presence in Washington Heights was likely due to gentrification did not amount to a sufficiently clear complaint opposing unlawful discrimination or put Temin on notice that Ramirez was reporting discriminatory conduct.

Because the court found that Ramirez’s race-based § 1981 discrimination claim failed, it also dismissed without prejudice her New York State Human Rights Law claims based on race, color, and national origin. It dismissed without prejudice her state-law sex-discrimination claims for the same failure to adequately plead an adverse employment action.

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s New York State disability claims. It held that the one-week leave after her surgery was an effective accommodation even though Ramirez had requested to work from home. It also held that Ramirez had not alleged that her migraines prevented her from performing her job without an accommodation. The court rejected her disability-based termination theory because she was not terminated or constructively discharged and did not adequately connect her disability to the alleged employment action.

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s New York State retaliation claims. Her statements about putting her health first, refusal to estimate or falsify statistics, complaint that the coffee incident was an assault, and accommodation requests did not adequately establish the required elements of protected activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection. The court stated that requests for reasonable accommodations can be protected activity, but found no adequately pleaded adverse action connected to those requests.

New York City Human Rights Law claims

The court applied the New York City Human Rights Law more liberally than the federal and state laws. Unlike the federal and state standards discussed in the opinion, the city law did not require Ramirez to plead a materially adverse employment action or conduct that was severe and pervasive. She instead had to allege facts supporting an inference that she was treated less well because of a protected characteristic.

The court held that Ramirez’s allegations about comments concerning red nail polish, her voice, lipstick, hoop earrings, dreadlocks, and other people of color were enough at the pleading stage to support an inference of discrimination based on race, color, national origin, and sex. It also held that her allegations concerning requested accommodations after surgery and for migraines were minimally sufficient under the city law. The defendants’ motion to dismiss those New York City discrimination claims was denied.

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s New York City retaliation claim because the retaliation allegations failed under the same standards applied to her federal and state retaliation claims.

Overtime claim

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s New York Labor Law overtime claim. Although she alleged that she regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, sometimes 50 to 60 hours and sometimes more, she did not identify specific hours worked in a particular week for which she was not paid overtime. The court held that the allegations were too general to satisfy the pleading standard.

Battery and emotional distress

The court denied the motion to dismiss Ramirez’s New York battery claim. Whether an ordinary person would find it offensive for Temin to slap Ramirez’s hand while she was carrying hot coffee, causing the coffee to spill, was an issue of fact that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

The court dismissed without prejudice Ramirez’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Even accepting her allegations as true, the court held that the alleged conduct did not meet New York’s demanding requirement that the conduct be extreme and outrageous—so far beyond ordinary workplace mistreatment that it is atrocious and intolerable in a civilized society.

Disposition

Judge Ramos’s order states that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted as to Counts Six through Fifteen and Seventeen, and denied as to Counts One through Five and Sixteen. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion.