Kuperman v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Moshe Kuperman, representing himself, sued the City of New York and Ronald James over events arising from his employment as a probationary physical education teacher at Public School 202 between September 2015 and June 2019. He asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Kuperman alleged that James became principal during his third school year and gave him two “ineffective” teaching evaluations, although his overall rating for that year was “effective.” Kuperman further alleged that James asked whether he was Jewish, was reluctant to approve leave for a Jewish holiday, failed to respond adequately to students’ race- and religion-based insults, and did not reschedule a meeting about Kuperman’s tenure. Kuperman was later told that he would not continue at the school and that his tenure had been denied. He also alleged that nonwhite and non-Jewish teachers received more favorable treatment and that a younger African American teacher replaced him.

Defendants’ motion

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally valid claim. On this type of motion, the court generally accepts nonconclusory factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff. The court also interpreted Kuperman’s self-represented filings liberally.

Title VII claims

The court dismissed Kuperman’s Title VII claims based on discrete acts occurring before January 8, 2019, because he alleged that he filed his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge on November 4, 2019, and the applicable filing period was 300 days. The court rejected his argument that the earlier acts formed a continuing violation, finding that he alleged separate acts rather than the repeated conduct required for that doctrine. The court stated, however, that the earlier acts could still be used as background evidence for timely claims.

New York State and New York City claims against the Department of Education

The court dismissed Kuperman’s New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law claims against the Department of Education because he did not allege that he had timely served the required notice of claim. The court also declined to grant permission for a late notice of claim because Kuperman had not shown that the relevant statutory factors supported that request.

Section 1981 claims

The court dismissed Kuperman’s Section 1981 claims against the City of New York and James in his official capacity. It explained that Section 1981 does not create a separate private claim against state actors. The court also considered whether the claims could instead be treated as claims under Section 1983, the federal civil-rights statute for actions under state law. It concluded that they still failed because Kuperman did not allege that the challenged conduct resulted from a governmental policy or custom. The court also noted that a school principal is not the final policymaker for the Department of Education for this purpose.

Race and religion discrimination claims

The court denied the motion to dismiss Kuperman’s timely race- and religion-discrimination claims. At the pleading stage, he needed to allege facts supporting at least a minimal inference that discrimination motivated the decision to discontinue his employment.

For religion, the court relied on the allegation that James asked whether Kuperman was Jewish during a meeting about possible tenure, shortly before the discontinuance, without giving a neutral reason for the question. The court also considered the allegations that James did not adequately respond to religious insults by students and was reluctant to approve Kuperman’s religious-holiday leave.

For race, the court considered Kuperman’s allegations that James did not adequately respond to students’ racial comments and replaced Kuperman with a younger African American teacher. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient at this stage, without deciding whether discrimination actually occurred.

Retaliation claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss Kuperman’s retaliation claims. It found that he did not plausibly allege that he engaged in legally protected activity or that a later adverse action resulted from that activity. His allegations concerned advocacy for special-needs students, reporting incidents, and requesting assistance, but did not sufficiently identify the advocacy, the retaliatory acts, or the connection between them. The court also noted that his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge came after his employment was discontinued and therefore could not have caused the earlier action.

Amendment and final disposition

The court declined to grant open-ended permission to amend the dismissed claims because Kuperman had not identified additional facts that would cure the defects. The defendants’ motion was therefore granted in part and denied in part: the specified untimely Title VII claims, the state and city claims against the Department of Education, the Section 1981 claims against the City and James in his official capacity, and the retaliation claims were dismissed, while the motion was denied in all other respects.

The court also terminated the City of New York as a defendant and reinstated the New York City Department of Education as a defendant. The order explained that an earlier order had incorrectly substituted the City for the Department. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the order.