Aiken v. MTA New York City Transit

Background

Geneva Aiken brought a religious employment-discrimination action against MTA New York City Transit and Donald Houston, Phakesia Murphy, and Alfred Caminero in their individual and official capacities. She asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil-rights cause of action for certain violations by people acting under state law.

Aiken is a Baptist who observes Sunday as her Sabbath and says her religious beliefs do not permit her to work Sundays. She had worked as a bus operator and was promoted to a probationary Surface Line Dispatcher on December 8, 2016. She sought Sundays off as a religious accommodation. She alleged that the individual defendants threatened her with “consequences” if she continued asking, that she was denied proper training and received poor performance evaluations because of her requests, and that Caminero effectively demoted her on January 25, 2018. The defendants said the demotion resulted from unsatisfactory performance; Aiken said she was told it was because of poor attendance. She resigned on August 6, 2018.

Review of the Recommendation

Magistrate Judge Debra Freeman recommended granting the defendants’ summary-judgment motion in part and denying it in part. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about facts that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The defendants objected to the recommendation, but Aiken did not. Judge Daniels reviewed the objections and adopted the recommendation in full, overruling the defendants’ objections.

The court also declined to decide at the summary-judgment stage whether the MTA or the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Authority was Aiken’s actual employer.

Claims That Survived Summary Judgment

The court denied summary judgment on:

- Aiken’s Title VII discrimination claim against the MTA based on her demotion. - Aiken’s New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claim against the MTA and Caminero based on the demotion, including the claim against Caminero as a direct participant and as an alleged aider and abettor of the MTA’s discrimination. - Aiken’s New York City Human Rights Law claims against the MTA and Caminero based on discriminatory and retaliatory demotion. - Aiken’s New York City Human Rights Law claims against all defendants based on an alleged hostile work environment, discrimination, and retaliation arising from coercive or threatening comments by the individual defendants after she requested a religious accommodation.

The court found that Caminero’s role in the demotion and his question about whether Aiken would have worked Sundays could support an inference of religious discrimination. It also found that a factfinder could determine that the defendants’ stated reasons for the demotion—poor performance and, at another point, poor attendance—were pretexts, meaning explanations masking unlawful discrimination. The court found a related factual dispute about whether Caminero could be liable for aiding and abetting discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law. It granted summary judgment to Houston and Murphy on that aiding-and-abetting claim.

Claims on Which Summary Judgment Was Granted

The court granted summary judgment on all other Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claims. It concluded that Aiken had not provided evidence connecting the denial of training or poor evaluations to religious discrimination, including evidence that other probationary dispatchers were similarly situated apart from religion.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claims. Although seeking a religious accommodation was protected activity and the alleged demotion, lack of training, and poor evaluations were adverse employment actions, the court found insufficient evidence that Aiken’s accommodation request was the required “but-for” cause of those actions.

The court also granted summary judgment on any Title VII or New York State Human Rights Law hostile-work-environment claims. It found that the alleged conduct was not severe or pervasive enough under those laws and that Aiken had not adequately connected the conduct to her religion.

The court granted summary judgment on all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It reasoned that those claims required proof that discrimination was the “but-for” cause of the challenged actions, while the Title VII demotion claim that survived required only evidence that religious bias was a motivating factor.

Under the New York City Human Rights Law, the court applied the more employee-protective standard requiring evidence that Aiken was treated less well or differently because of religion in a way that was more than trivial. It denied summary judgment on the specified demotion and comments claims but granted it on all other New York City Human Rights Law discrimination, retaliation, and hostile-work-environment claims.

Disposition

Judge Daniels ordered that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The clerk was directed to close the motion.