Baker v. Weber

Background

Tanisia N. Baker sued Carl Weber, Urban Books, LLC, Urban Books Media, LLC, Kensington Publishing Corporation, Vickie Stringer, Vickie Stringer Publishing, LLC, Triple Crown Publications, and Vickie Stringer Agency, LLC. She asserted copyright infringement and related claims concerning her books Sheisty and Still Sheisty. Baker alleged that the defendants relied on a nonexistent license to publish and distribute the books.

Baker had signed a 2003 publishing agreement giving Triple Crown Publications the exclusive right to print, publish, and sell the books. The agreement allowed Triple Crown Publications to assign the agreement and included provisions allowing Baker to terminate it in specified circumstances, including certain forms of reorganization or liquidation. Triple Crown Publications later dissolved, and the parties disputed whether it had properly assigned the publishing rights and whether Baker’s rights reverted to her in 2011.

In 2014, Triple Crown Productions licensed distribution rights for the books to Urban Books. Urban Books began publishing Sheisty in 2015, Still Sheisty in 2016, and a combined edition called The Sheisty Saga in 2017. Baker did not receive royalties from the defendants. She filed the lawsuit on February 5, 2019. The defendants named as the Defaulting Defendants were served but did not respond, and the Clerk entered a certificate of default against them.

Motions and legal standards

Baker moved for partial summary judgment against the responding defendants on copyright infringement. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Baker also moved for default judgment against the Defaulting Defendants.

To prove copyright infringement, Baker had to show ownership of valid copyrights and infringement by the defendants. A license is an affirmative defense: if the defendants had permission to use the works, their failure to pay Baker would generally support a contract claim rather than copyright infringement. The defendants argued that they had an actual written license through the 2014 agreement or, alternatively, an implied license based on Baker’s conduct. They also asserted equitable estoppel, laches, and lack of copyright notice as defenses.

Summary-judgment ruling

The court concluded that Baker established ownership of valid copyrights in both books. The defendants did not contest her ownership in their opposition, and the existence of other copyright registrations did not defeat Baker’s ownership showing.

The court nevertheless denied Baker’s motion for partial summary judgment because material factual disputes remained about infringement and the defendants’ defenses. The parties disputed whether the 2003 agreement allowed Baker to terminate the agreement after Triple Crown Publications dissolved, whether the agreement’s reorganization and liquidation provisions applied, and whether the publishing rights reverted to Baker. Those issues affected whether Triple Crown Productions could grant an actual license to Urban Books.

The court also found factual disputes about an implied license. The Second Circuit had not adopted one exclusive test for determining whether an implied copyright license exists. The court held that, outside the work-for-hire context, the relevant inquiry can include whether the parties’ overall conduct showed an intent to permit use of the copyrighted work. The parties disputed whether Baker knew about the 2014 license and the defendants’ publication of her books, whether her silence showed consent, and whether Triple Crown Productions appeared to have authority to license the works.

The court declined to strike the equitable-estoppel defense because factual disputes remained about Baker’s knowledge, the defendants’ understanding, and whether the defendants reasonably relied on Baker’s conduct. The court struck the laches defense for alleged infringements occurring on or after February 5, 2016, because those claims fell within the Copyright Act’s three-year limitations period. It did not resolve the laches issue for earlier publications because factual disputes remained about when Baker should have discovered the alleged infringement.

The court struck lack of constructive copyright notice as a defense to liability. Baker had registered her copyrights before the alleged infringement, which placed the public on notice of her ownership. The existence of other copyright registrations could affect damages, but innocent or mistaken infringement was not a defense to liability. The court stated that the same reasoning applied to any lack-of-actual-notice argument raised as a liability defense.

Default-judgment ruling

The court denied without prejudice Baker’s motion for default judgment against Vickie Stringer, Vickie Stringer Publishing LLC, Vickie Stringer Agency LLC, and Triple Crown Publications. The court reasoned that effective relief could not be granted against those defendants before resolving Baker’s rights under the 2003 agreement, including whether she terminated the agreement in 2011. The court therefore followed the practice of withholding default judgment against nonresponding defendants while the merits remain unresolved as to the other defendants.

Disposition

The court denied Baker’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied without prejudice Baker’s motion for default judgment. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motions at Docket Numbers 75 and 88.