Glaudino v. Long Island Railroad Company
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:20-cv-01159
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Glaudino v. Long Island Railroad Company, Judge Schofield granted in part a motion limiting treating physicians’ trial testimony because disclosures were inadequate.
The ruling affects Christopher Glaudino’s eight treating physicians and limits the medical testimony they may give at trial, while defining the information available to Long Island Railroad Company for cross-examination and rebuttal.
What happened
In Glaudino v. Long Island Railroad Company, the plaintiff alleged that he was electrically shocked while power washing railroad ties near an energized third rail and sued under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The railroad asked the court to exclude testimony from the plaintiff’s treating physicians or limit what they could say because the plaintiff had not provided the required expert disclosures.
The court found that the plaintiff’s disclosures were too general. They did not identify the specific opinions each physician would give or the facts supporting those opinions, leaving the railroad without a reasonable opportunity to prepare for cross-examination or obtain rebuttal testimony.
Judge Schofield granted in part the railroad’s motion. At trial, each treating physician’s testimony is limited to facts learned and opinions formed during consultations with the plaintiff, as reflected in medical records provided to the railroad.
The detailed version
- Glaudino v. Long Island Railroad Company · No. 1:20-cv-01159
- Lorna Schofield
- Oct. 12, 2021
Background
Christopher Glaudino alleged that he suffered an electrical shock while power washing railroad ties near an energized third rail while employed by Long Island Railroad Company. He alleged that the railroad’s negligence violated the Federal Employers Liability Act by assigning him to work near the energized rail.
Glaudino identified eight treating physicians who were expected to testify about his medical condition, treatment, associated costs, injuries, prognosis, ability to work, and causation. His disclosures also stated that the physicians might testify about shock, anxiety, hypervigilance, post-traumatic stress disorder, lack of sleep, ulcerative colitis symptoms, future treatment, and the relationship between the incident and his claimed injuries.
The Motion
The railroad filed a motion in limine, which is a request to limit or exclude evidence at trial. It argued that the treating physicians should be excluded because Glaudino had not provided the expert reports required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). Alternatively, the railroad asked the court to limit the physicians’ testimony to facts learned during treatment, as reflected in their treatment records.
The court explained that treating-physician testimony can include facts and opinions formed during treatment, opinions based on outside information, or testimony from a physician retained specifically to provide expert testimony. Rule 26(a)(2)(C), which applies to certain treating-physician testimony, requires disclosure of the subject matter and a summary of the facts and opinions the physician is expected to provide.
Analysis
The court did not decide whether the physicians had been retained specifically to provide expert testimony and therefore needed full written reports. Instead, it held that Glaudino’s disclosures were inadequate even under the less demanding Rule 26(a)(2)(C) standard.
The disclosures gave only general descriptions of the proposed opinions. At most, they notified the railroad that the physicians would opine that the workplace incident caused shock, anxiety, hypervigilance, post-traumatic stress disorder, and lack of sleep. The disclosures did not identify the specific opinions on other subjects or the specific facts each physician would discuss in support of those opinions.
Because the disclosures did not provide enough information for the railroad to prepare for cross-examination or arrange rebuttal expert testimony, the court limited the physicians’ testimony to facts acquired and opinions formed during their consultations with Glaudino, as reflected in medical records produced to the railroad.
Disposition
The court granted in part the railroad’s motion in limine. At trial, each treating physician’s testimony must be limited to facts acquired and opinions formed during consultations with Glaudino and reflected in the medical records produced to the railroad.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.