Quattlander v. Ray, III

Background

Vera-Lynn Quattlander owned and lived in a home next to property owned by William Ray. The opinion’s caption identifies the defendant as William Ray, III, but a footnote states that he was apparently William Ray II and directs the clerk to amend the caption accordingly. Ray did not live at the neighboring property; he had rented it to Janet Davila for approximately 25 years. Davila left in spring 2018, after which the property was vacant.

Quattlander experienced asthma, sickle-cell disease, fibromyalgia, and sensitivity to certain chemicals. She reported odors and fumes to the police and fire departments and suspected that they came from Ray’s property, possibly because of illegal drug activity. She also alleged harassment and vandalism by Davila and Richard Morales, Davila’s boyfriend. The parties agreed that raccoons had infested the space between their homes and that the raccoons’ urine produced an ammonia smell. Ray hired a contractor to install a mesh barrier, but Quattlander initially consented to the work and later withdrew her permission; the contractor removed the barrier.

Quattlander also alleged that Ray’s roof repairs caused loud hammering and that the roof extended over the space between the homes. The properties shared a sewer line that backed up in 2011, sending water and sewage into Quattlander’s home. Her home showed water intrusion and mold, but she did not remediate the mold identified in an environmental report. Quattlander did not provide expert disclosures by the court’s deadline and did not later file the additional environmental and medical evidence she said she was trying to obtain.

Legal standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. After a defendant identifies an absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claims, the plaintiff must present admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could rule in her favor. The plaintiff cannot rely only on speculation, unsupported allegations, or uncertainty about what caused the alleged injury.

Discussion

Harassment and alleged illegal activity by tenants. Quattlander acknowledged that Davila and Morales, not Ray, allegedly harassed her. Under New York law, a landlord generally is not liable for tenants’ wrongful acts unless the landlord retained control and had a reasonable opportunity or effective means to prevent or remedy the conduct. The court found no evidence that Quattlander complained to Ray about the harassment or that he could have stopped it by entering the property. The court also found no evidence that the tenants engaged in an illegal drug business or that Ray knowingly permitted such activity. It therefore granted summary judgment on claims seeking to hold Ray responsible for the tenants’ conduct.

Water, sewage, and fumes. Ray argued that the 2011 water and sewage incident was outside the applicable three-year limitations period and that there was no evidence that he caused the intrusion. The court did not need to resolve the timeliness issue because, even assuming the claims were timely, Quattlander offered only speculation about Ray’s responsibility. Ray’s experts attributed the sewer backup to an antiquated and defective common sewer line and found no chemical fumes in Ray’s house or the space between the homes. One expert found high mold-spore concentrations in parts of Quattlander’s home and concluded that Ray’s conduct and property did not cause the water, sewer, or vapor intrusions. Quattlander did not provide evidence that could allow a rational jury to identify Ray’s property as the source of the fumes or sewage-related harm.

Private nuisance and abnormally dangerous activity. The court explained that a private nuisance requires a substantial, intentional, unreasonable, and continuing interference with a person’s use and enjoyment of land. An abnormally dangerous activity can lead to strict liability, but the court determines whether an activity qualifies by considering several factors, including the degree and seriousness of the risk, whether reasonable care can eliminate it, whether the activity is common, and whether it is appropriate for the location. The court found no evidence that fumes came from Ray’s property. It further stated that the claimed smells, including bleach, ammonia, chlorine, paint, insecticide, and acetone, were commonly associated with residential cleaning, maintenance, and repair, and that roof-repair hammering was reasonable and unavoidable. Quattlander also offered no evidence that these activities were continuous, recurring, or unreasonable. The court granted summary judgment on these claims.

Trespass. A trespass requires an intentional entry onto another person’s property without permission or justification. The court found that Quattlander had not submitted photographs or other evidence proving that Ray’s roof overhung her property, nor documentation establishing that the disputed space belonged to her. The court also found that she had given permission for the mesh barrier to be installed and that it was promptly removed after she withdrew permission. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the trespass claims. It also noted that intangible intrusions such as odors and noise ordinarily are addressed as nuisance rather than trespass.

Medical monitoring and fear of illness. The court held that Quattlander had not shown that she was exposed to a disease-causing agent from Ray’s property or that there was a rational basis for fearing that she would contract an illness. Online articles about sewer gas and carbon monoxide were not sufficient evidence connecting her health problems to Ray’s property. The court also explained that New York does not recognize medical monitoring as an independent cause of action; medical monitoring may be available as a remedy when a plaintiff proves physical injury and entitlement to damages under an existing tort claim. Because the court granted summary judgment on all of Quattlander’s tort claims and she had not produced specific evidence of physical injuries caused by Ray, it granted summary judgment on the medical-monitoring and fear-of-illness claims as well.

Disposition

Judge Cathy Seibel granted Ray’s motion for summary judgment. The court directed the clerk to amend the caption to identify the defendant as William Ray II, terminate the pending motion, and close the case.