Moye v. United States
- John Cronan
- 1:20-cv-03059-JPC-RWL
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 8
In Moye v. United States, Judge Cronan denied Moye’s motion to vacate because his firearm conviction remained supported by a drug-trafficking predicate.
Edwin Moye, whose motion to vacate his federal sentence was denied; the United States prevailed in defending the firearm conviction and consecutive sentence.
What happened
In Moye v. United States, Edwin Moye asked the court to vacate the 60-month consecutive sentence for his firearm conviction. He argued that the conviction relied on a definition of “crime of violence” that the Supreme Court had invalidated.
Moye had pleaded guilty to a racketeering conspiracy and to possessing or using a firearm in connection with both that conspiracy and a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy. The government agreed that the racketeering conspiracy could no longer serve as the firearm charge’s “crime of violence” predicate after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis.
Judge John P. Cronan denied Moye’s motion. The court ruled that the cocaine-trafficking conspiracy was an independent qualifying predicate under the firearm statute, and that one valid predicate was enough to support the conviction.
The detailed version
- Moye v. United States · No. 1:20-cv-03059-JPC-RWL
- John Cronan
- Nov. 10, 2021
Background
In October 2016, Edwin Moye pleaded guilty to two counts: participating in a racketeering conspiracy and violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) by using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence and a drug-trafficking crime. In September 2017, Judge William H. Pauley III sentenced him to 96 months on the racketeering count and a consecutive 60 months on the firearm count, for a total of 156 months.
The § 924(c) count in the superseding charging document identified two predicates: the racketeering conspiracy as a crime of violence and a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine as a drug-trafficking crime. During his guilty-plea hearing, Moye confirmed that he understood both predicates and admitted that he sometimes possessed a firearm while selling crack cocaine.
Moye later moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence. He argued that his firearm conviction was invalid because it rested on § 924(c)’s “Residual Clause,” which defines a crime of violence as an offense involving a substantial risk that physical force may be used.
Legal framework
Section 924(c) requires a mandatory consecutive prison term when a defendant uses, carries, or possesses a firearm in furtherance of either a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime. In United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s Residual Clause is unconstitutionally vague. The government conceded that, after Davis, Moye’s racketeering conspiracy could not support the § 924(c) conviction as a crime-of-violence predicate.
A drug-trafficking crime under § 924(c) includes a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. The court explained that the cocaine-trafficking conspiracy charged as an additional predicate qualified under this definition. It also explained that a defendant need not be separately convicted of the underlying drug-trafficking offense for it to serve as a § 924(c) predicate.
Ruling
The court held that Moye’s § 924(c) conviction remained valid because it had two predicates and the drug-trafficking conspiracy was independently sufficient. Davis invalidated the crime-of-violence predicate but did not invalidate the drug-trafficking predicate. Because one qualifying predicate was enough, the court denied Moye’s motion to vacate his sentence.
The order also directed the Clerk of Court to close the pending motion in the criminal case, close the related civil case, and mail the order to Moye, who had litigated the motion without a lawyer.
Read the full 8-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.