Moleon v. Alston

Background

Frantz Moleon worked as a garage attendant for SP Plus Corporation and belonged to Garage Employees Local Union 272. He alleged that SP Plus changed his work assignments and limited his access to breaks, water, and bathrooms during the COVID-19 pandemic. Moleon has diabetes, which he alleged impaired his bladder control and made it necessary for him to administer insulin and use the bathroom regularly.

On October 1, 2020, while working an eight-hour shift, Moleon alleged that he could not access an occupied employee bathroom and could not reach another bathroom in time. He alleged that he involuntarily urinated outside the bathroom. Kent Security employee Ronald Manning reported the incident as public urination and vandalism. SP Plus terminated Moleon on October 8, 2020, and union representatives allegedly supported the account that the urination was intentional. Moleon later filed a discharge grievance, but the Union did not pursue arbitration.

Moleon’s Second Amended Complaint asserted claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and federal wage law, as well as state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, prima facie tort, and civil conspiracy. The Employer Defendants—SP Plus and Margarita Lopez—moved to dismiss all claims against them. The Union Defendants—Fred Alston and John Doe 1—moved to dismiss all claims against them except the duty-of-fair-representation claim. The Kent Defendants answered and did not move to dismiss.

Rulings on the Federal Claims

The court dismissed all of Moleon’s ERISA claims. It held that the allegations did not plausibly show that SP Plus, Lopez, or the Union specifically intended to interfere with Moleon’s benefits because of his race, age, or diabetes. The allegations also did not plausibly show retaliation for activity protected by ERISA. The court separately dismissed the ERISA fiduciary-duty claim against the Union because the complaint did not identify any discretionary authority or plan-administration functions that the Union performed.

The court dismissed Moleon’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against SP Plus, Lopez, and the Union Defendants. Those claims alleged a racially hostile work environment and wrongful termination, but the court found the allegations of racial motivation and “but-for” causation conclusory. The court also dismissed the § 1981 claims brought on behalf of similarly situated employees.

The court dismissed the § 1983 claims against all defendants because Moleon expressly abandoned them in his opposition papers. The court did not decide whether the defendants could otherwise qualify as private actors acting under state authority.

Rulings on the State-Law Claims

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction over related state claims connected to surviving federal claims. It then dismissed the state tort claims subject to the motions. As to the Union, the court dismissed the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, prima facie tort, and civil conspiracy because Moleon did not allege that every union member participated in, authorized, or knowingly approved the challenged conduct, as required by the rule the court applied to New York tort claims against unions.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against SP Plus, Lopez, and Doe. It held that the alleged statements, termination, work assignments, threats, wage issues, and restricted bathroom access did not meet New York’s demanding requirement of conduct so extreme and outrageous that it exceeds all possible bounds of decency.

The court dismissed the defamation claims based on Lopez’s statements because the complaint did not identify the recipients, timing, or manner of publication with enough specificity, and because statements made during the grievance process or to SP Plus employees were covered by the common-interest privilege. The court dismissed the defamation claim against Doe because his statement that Moleon had urinated in public was substantially true as alleged and his statement that the conduct was grounds for termination was an opinion.

The court dismissed the prima facie-tort claims because they relied on the same facts as the deficient traditional tort claims and did not plausibly allege that the defendants acted with the sole intent to harm Moleon. It dismissed the civil-conspiracy claim because the underlying tort claims were inadequately pleaded.

Disposition

Judge Engelmayer granted in full the Employer Defendants’ and Union Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The claims that survived because they were not challenged were the Union duty-of-fair-representation claim and all claims against the Kent Defendants. The Clerk was directed to terminate SP Plus, Lopez, and Doe as parties. The opinion did not state that the dismissed claims were dismissed with or without prejudice.