Kane v. de Blasio

Background

The order addressed two related cases: Kane v. de Blasio, No. 21-CV-7863, and Keil v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-8773. The plaintiffs were Department of Education employees who asserted religious objections to vaccination. They sought relief against enforcement of New York City’s vaccine mandate.

The court had previously denied preliminary-injunction requests in both cases. The plaintiffs appealed. While the appeals were pending, the Second Circuit required the City to give the named plaintiffs an opportunity to have their religious-accommodation requests reconsidered by a central citywide panel. The Second Circuit later vacated the earlier denials of preliminary relief, required an injunction during the reconsideration process, and sent the cases back to the district court. After the citywide-panel proceedings ended, the plaintiffs asked the district court for renewed relief.

Requests and rulings

The plaintiffs requested three principal forms of relief: a preliminary injunction stopping enforcement of the vaccine mandate against employees with sincere religious objections; provisional certification of a class consisting of Department of Education employees who asserted religious objections; and immediate reinstatement of the plaintiffs and proposed class members to their prior positions.

The court lifted the stays in both cases and denied the preliminary-injunction motion. A preliminary injunction is an order issued before final judgment. The court emphasized that irreparable harm—harm that cannot be repaired later—is a required element. It found that the plaintiffs had not shown such harm. The alleged injuries consisted of lost income and possible losses of health insurance and other benefits. The court concluded that these were economic injuries that could be remedied through money damages if the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, and that reinstatement could also be available.

The court also held that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The record contained little information about the citywide panel’s process, including no copies of the applications submitted to the panel. The court said the available information did not establish that the process was not neutral and rational or that it was hostile to religion. The panel’s questions about prior vaccination, other substances the employees considered impermissible, medications developed or tested using fetal-cell lines, and conduct outside the COVID-19 context appeared directed toward determining whether particular beliefs were sincerely held and religious in nature. The court treated those as permissible factual inquiries at this stage.

Because the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm or a likelihood of success, the court did not decide whether the balance of hardships or the public interest favored an injunction. It also denied the plaintiffs’ request to require defendants to reinstate them. The order separately states that the Second Circuit’s injunction was no longer in effect because the reconsideration proceedings had concluded.

Class certification and consolidation

The court denied without prejudice the request to certify a class of all Department of Education employees who asserted religious objections to the vaccine mandate. The court found the request premature because neither operative complaint properly contained class allegations, the Kane plaintiffs’ amended complaint had been filed without leave and had not been accepted as the operative pleading, and the Keil plaintiffs had withdrawn their request for leave to amend. The pleadings also did not contain factual allegations about the citywide panel’s decisions, and no fully briefed, adequately supported class-certification motion had been filed.

The court further denied the request to reinstate proposed class members because no class had been certified. It ordered the two cases consolidated under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with 21-CV-7863 designated as the lead case. Judge Valerie Caproni did not issue a final ruling on the underlying legality of the vaccine mandate or the plaintiffs’ individual accommodation claims in this order.