Robles v. Holy See

Background

Thomas Alberto Robles alleged that Barry F. Bossa repeatedly sexually abused him between 1981 and 1986, when Robles was a minor and Bossa was a priest at Mt. Carmel Church in New York City. Robles sued several defendants, including the Holy See, various New York religious organizations, and the Archbishop of New York.

Robles asserted five types of claims against the Holy See: negligence, including vicarious liability; negligent training, supervision, and retention, including vicarious liability; gross negligence; breach of contract; and violations of customary international law. He alleged that the Holy See's 1962 policy and 1917 Canon of Law required secrecy concerning certain allegations of sexual misconduct and contributed to the abuse.

The Holy See moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6), arguing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that Robles lacked standing, and that he failed to state a legally sufficient claim. The court focused primarily on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which generally gives foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless a statutory exception applies.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act analysis

The court rejected Robles's reliance on the commercial-activity exception. It held that the complaint's central substance was a personal-injury tort claim based on alleged sexual abuse, not a commercial claim. The court also held that the implied-contract claim did not provide a jurisdictional basis because it was neither commercial nor a tort claim. That claim was dismissed with prejudice against the Holy See.

The court considered the tortious-act exception, which can permit claims for money damages for personal injury caused in the United States by a foreign state's official or employee acting within the scope of employment. The court held that Robles had not overcome the presumption that the Pallottines, Mt. Carmel Church, and the Archdiocese of New York were legally separate entities from the Holy See. Claims based on the conduct of those entities were dismissed with prejudice.

The court also held that the tortious-act exception does not extend to claims based on the conduct of agents because the statute refers to officials and employees but does not include agents. Claims based on alleged acts or omissions of Holy See agents were dismissed with prejudice.

The court nevertheless held that the complaint plausibly alleged, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that Bossa, the Archbishop, and other American clergy could have been employees of the Holy See. The court said that further fact-finding might show otherwise, but the alleged degree of control was enough to allow the employment issue to proceed at that stage. The court applied state-law principles to the employment question and also considered federal common-law principles.

Scope of employment and location of conduct

Under New York law, clergy sexual abuse is not within the scope of the clergy member's employment. Therefore, the Holy See could not be held vicariously liable for Bossa's alleged sexual abuse, and claims based on Bossa's conduct were subject to dismissal.

The court reached a different conclusion at the pleading stage for alleged conduct by supervisory clergy and the Archbishop. Robles alleged that clergy carrying out the Holy See's policies failed to report abuse, failed to warn parishioners, maintained secrecy, and took other actions concerning Bossa. Those allegations were sufficient at that stage to satisfy the tortious-act exception's requirements concerning conduct by alleged employees acting within the scope of their employment.

The court held, however, that the tortious-act exception requires the entire tort to have occurred in the United States. Robles's direct claims were based in part on conduct by the Holy See that occurred at the Vatican, including promulgating policies and supervising personnel. The court therefore dismissed the direct negligence, negligent-training, supervision, and retention, gross-negligence, and customary-international-law claims against the Holy See with prejudice.

Discretionary-function exclusion

The court held that the discretionary-function exclusion barred the vicarious-liability claims for negligent training, supervision, and retention and for violations of customary international law. That exclusion applies to claims based on governmental decisions involving judgment or choice and matters the exclusion is intended to protect. The court found that the complaint did not adequately allege that local clergy had no discretion in carrying out the relevant policies, and employment and supervision decisions were the type of policy judgments protected by the exclusion.

The court concluded that the broader vicarious-liability negligence claim might be amended. Robles could potentially allege facts showing that clergy knew Bossa was abusing children after becoming a priest, kept silent because the 1962 policy required secrecy, and had no discretion to warn parents, Robles, or authorities. That claim was dismissed without prejudice to Robles seeking leave to amend.

Standing and failure to state a claim

The court rejected the Holy See's standing argument. It held that the alleged injury was sufficiently traceable to the alleged negligence of supervising clergy and the Archbishop. The court did not need to decide whether the complaint stated a claim because it was dismissing the claims against the Holy See for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, although it discussed some of the parties' arguments.

The court also concluded that the remaining negligence claim was properly revived under New York's Child Victims Act because the alleged employees were persons covered by the statute and the claim could be brought against any party, including on a vicarious-liability theory.

Disposition

The court dismissed without prejudice Robles's negligence claim based on the alleged actions of Holy See employees. It dismissed with prejudice all of Robles's remaining claims against the Holy See. Robles could seek leave to file an amended complaint by January 20, 2022. The opinion did not resolve the claims against the other defendants.