Drew v. City of New York
- Laura Swain
- 1:18-cv-10719
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 17
In Drew v. City of New York, Judge Swain granted Defendants’ summary-judgment motion and motion to dismiss, ending Keith Drew’s constitutional-rights case over Rikers Island lockdowns.
Keith Drew and the City of New York and the other defendants named in the amended complaint; the judgment ended Drew’s claims in this case.
What happened
In Drew v. City of New York, Keith Drew, representing himself, alleged that lockdowns and housing classification at Rikers Island violated his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to dismiss the amended complaint, and Drew did not oppose either motion.
The court held that Drew’s claims concerning lockdowns before November 8, 2016, were covered by a general release he signed in an earlier settlement. The court then ruled that his remaining claim about a 12-hour lockdown in September 2018 did not plausibly allege violations of freedom of association, confinement conditions, or due process.
Judge Swain granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety and granted their motion to dismiss the remaining claims. The court directed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case.
The detailed version
- Drew v. City of New York · No. 1:18-cv-10719
- Laura Swain
- Jan. 3, 2022
Background
Keith Drew brought this self-represented civil-rights action against the City of New York and current or former correctional officials, correctional officers, medical personnel, and a New York City Board of Correction employee. He alleged that four lockdowns at the George R. Vierno Center and Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island violated his constitutional rights while he was a pretrial detainee. The alleged lockdowns occurred in December 2015, February–March 2016, and September 2018. Drew sought injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and actual damages.
The defendants filed two motions: a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, and a motion for partial summary judgment under Rule 56. Drew did not respond to either motion, so the court treated both as unopposed.
Summary Judgment and the General Release
The defendants argued that claims based on incidents before November 8, 2016, were barred by a general release Drew signed as part of a settlement of three earlier actions. The release stated that, in exchange for a $5,000 payment from the City, Drew released the City and its past and present officials, employees, representatives, and agents from civil-rights and related state-law claims arising through the date of the release.
The court found that the release was authentic, unambiguous, and enforceable on the record before it. It concluded that the December 2015 and February–March 2016 claims fell within the release because the incidents occurred before November 8, 2016, and the defendants were the City or its employees. The court therefore dismissed Drew’s claims that predated the release. The court stated that only the allegations concerning the September 2018 lockdown remained for consideration under the motion to dismiss.
Motion to Dismiss
The court analyzed the September 2018 allegations under several constitutional theories.
Freedom of association. Drew alleged that the lockdown improperly interfered with familial association and association with other detainees. The court held that he did not provide factual details showing how the 12-hour lockdown interfered with family contact, such as missed calls or visits, or what specific harm resulted from separation from other inmates. The court also noted that it was unaware of authority protecting an incarcerated person’s right to associate with other inmates during a 12-hour period. It therefore found that Drew failed to state a First Amendment association claim.
Conditions of confinement. The court explained that a pretrial detainee must plausibly allege both sufficiently serious conditions and deliberate indifference by officials. The court found that Drew did not allege that he suffered harm or was deprived of a basic human need during the September 2018 lockdown. He also did not allege that any defendant knew or should have known that the lockdown created an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his health. The court therefore concluded that he failed to state a conditions-of-confinement claim.
Due process. Drew alleged that inaccurate high-charge designations led to an improper housing classification and lockdown without adequate procedures for challenging the classification. The court held that he did not allege facts showing that the classification or housing placement was imposed with an expressed intent to punish him, or that the resulting conditions were excessive compared with legitimate institutional interests. The court also stated that New York City Board of Correction minimum standards do not create a protected liberty interest in a particular security classification or protection from misclassification.
The court separately rejected Drew’s substantive due-process theory. It held that a 12-hour lockdown, without more, was insufficient to show conduct so egregious or outrageous that it violated substantive due process.
Because Drew had not plausibly alleged a constitutional violation, the court did not reach the defendants’ additional arguments concerning the personal involvement of certain defendants or municipal liability.
Disposition
The court granted the defendants’ unopposed motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety and granted the defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss the amended complaint as to the remaining claims. The order resolved docket entries 30 and 37, directed the Clerk to enter judgment, and directed the Clerk to close the case.
Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.