Eckert v. The City Of New York

Background

Steven C. Eckert was an officer in the New York Police Department’s Harbor Unit. On November 3, 2016, he and another officer used Launch 622 to retrieve the body of a person who had jumped from the Throgs Neck Bridge into the East River. The officers brought the body near the boat with a pike pole and then pulled it onto a lowered swim platform and into the boat. Eckert said that the effort required several attempts because of the body’s weight and the waves, and that he began experiencing back pain during the rescue. He was taken to a hospital afterward and was later diagnosed with herniated and bulging discs and impinged nerves. He received treatment, including surgery.

Eckert asserted negligence under the Jones Act and an unseaworthiness claim under general maritime law. He argued that Launch 622 was unsafe for retrieving bodies because it lacked equipment such as a Jason’s cradle, sling, or fulcrum device; had design features that made the retrieval more difficult; and was inadequately staffed, lit, or equipped. He also claimed that the City had not adequately trained the crew. Eckert initially asserted a maintenance-and-cure claim for food, lodging, and medical expenses, but later withdrew that claim because he had already obtained the relief.

Summary-judgment standard

The City moved for summary judgment, which is a ruling without a trial when no genuine dispute over an important fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court had to view disputed facts in the light most favorable to Eckert. The court noted that summary judgment is generally disfavored when the parties present materially conflicting expert reports.

Jones Act claim

The Jones Act requires an employer to provide a reasonably safe workplace for a seaman. To proceed, Eckert needed evidence that a dangerous condition existed on the boat, that the City knew or should have known about it, and that the City’s negligence played at least some part in causing his injury.

The City argued that Eckert could not show a dangerous condition because no statute or regulation required Launch 622 to carry the additional rescue equipment identified by his experts. The court rejected that argument. It held that a dangerous condition under the Jones Act can be supported by evidence of industry customs, practices, available safety devices, equipment fitness, training, or safety procedures; proof of a statutory or regulatory violation is not required.

The court found sufficient evidence for a jury to consider several theories. Eckert’s experts stated that the “snatch-and-grab” method used to retrieve the body placed excessive pressure on Eckert’s spine and that safer equipment could have reduced or avoided the need for manual lifting. They also identified alleged design problems involving the davit, stern-door opening, storage box, rescue well, swim platform, and lighting. In addition, the experts identified possible inadequate staffing, supervision, training, and safety analysis.

The City’s expert disagreed. He stated that the snatch-and-grab method was an established and adequate rescue method, that the boat was fit for its intended purpose, and that additional equipment might have displaced other equipment or failed to prevent Eckert’s injury. The court held that the jury, rather than the court on summary judgment, must weigh these conflicting opinions.

The court also found sufficient evidence concerning notice. Eckert testified that he and others had questioned why the Harbor Unit lacked equipment used by other vessels. The record also indicated that the City had not performed a job safety analysis and had not produced certain requested records concerning the design and equipment of Launch 622 and similar boats. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that the City knew or should have known about the alleged dangers.

On causation, the court rejected the City’s argument that Eckert needed to prove causation to a special maritime standard. The court applied the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and found that a jury could determine that the boat’s alleged equipment, design, staffing, or training deficiencies contributed to Eckert’s injury. The court excluded from consideration, for purposes of causation, the experts’ theories concerning unsecured stairs and knife-like flanges and shafts because the reports did not connect those conditions to Eckert’s injury. The other theories were sufficient to proceed.

Unseaworthiness claim

Under general maritime law, a shipowner has an absolute duty to provide a ship, equipment, and crew that are reasonably fit for their intended service. This is a no-fault theory, meaning that liability does not depend on proving negligence or notice. Eckert still had to show that the boat, its equipment, or its crew was unseaworthy and that the condition substantially contributed to his injury as a direct or reasonably probable consequence.

The City again argued that Eckert had not identified a statute or regulation requiring the equipment he said was missing. The court rejected that argument for the same reason it rejected the City’s Jones Act argument: evidence of customary practices and expert opinions may support a finding that a vessel was insufficiently or defectively equipped even without a statutory or regulatory violation.

The court found triable factual disputes about whether Launch 622 was reasonably fit for retrieving a dead body. Eckert’s experts identified the lack of devices that could reduce manual exertion, allegedly defective rescue wells, the placement of the davit, the narrow stern-door opening, and the location of a storage box as possible defects. They also offered opinions that better equipment, training, staffing, or design would have reduced the pressure on Eckert’s spine and the risk of injury. The City’s competing evidence created factual issues for the jury.

Maintenance and cure claim and disposition

Eckert withdrew his maintenance-and-cure claim because he had already obtained that relief. The court therefore granted the City’s unopposed motion for summary judgment on that claim.

The court otherwise denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. The case was to proceed to trial on those claims, and the court directed the parties to submit a joint pretrial order.