Jackson v. NYC Transit Authority

Background

Elbert D. Jackson proceeded without a lawyer. He sued New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), Leonard Akselrod, TWU Local 100, and Jose “Joe” Costales. The opinion describes Jackson as a former NYCTA employee who suffered knee injuries and underwent at least three surgeries. Jackson alleged that NYCTA terminated his employment while he was disabled and that TWU Local 100 and Costales mishandled his disciplinary matter.

Jackson had filed a related complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (NYSDHR), alleging disability and age discrimination. NYSDHR dismissed that complaint after finding no support for discrimination and concluding that NYCTA’s investigation led to disciplinary charges involving its dual-employment policy and allegedly falsified statements. Jackson did not appear at a rescheduled disciplinary hearing, and the record stated that his grievance was treated as abandoned under the collective bargaining agreement. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) later sent Jackson an April 17, 2019 letter stating that his NYSDHR matter had been closed and that he had been issued a notice of the right to sue.

Motions and Legal Standard

NYCTA and Akselrod filed one motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and TWU Local 100 and Costales filed another. The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint alleges enough facts to make a legally valid claim plausible. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motions but did not accept legal conclusions as true. It also read Jackson’s filings liberally because he was representing himself.

New York City Human Rights Law Claims

The court held that Jackson’s claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (CHRL) against NYCTA and Akselrod were barred by the law’s election-of-remedies provision. That provision generally prevents a person from bringing a court case based on the same alleged discriminatory incident after filing a related complaint with NYSDHR. The court found that Jackson’s CHRL claims arose from the same termination-related incident as his NYSDHR complaint. It found that neither recognized exception applied because NYSDHR had dismissed the case for lack of probable cause rather than administrative convenience, and the complaint had not been referred from the EEOC to NYSDHR.

The court reached the same conclusion for CHRL claims against the Union Defendants to the extent those claims arose from the termination. To the extent Jackson’s claims were instead read as alleging that the union discriminated against him as a union member, the court held that the allegations still failed. Jackson alleged that the union defendants mishandled his case and did not follow collective-bargaining procedures, but he did not allege facts plausibly showing that their conduct was motivated, even partly, by disability discrimination.

Duty of Fair Representation

The court construed Jackson’s allegations against the Union Defendants as possibly asserting a breach of the duty of fair representation. That duty requires a union to avoid arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct when representing employees. The court found that Jackson’s allegations might show that the union’s representation was unsatisfactory or below his expectations, but they did not plausibly show arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct. The court also noted that Jackson did not claim that he had asked TWU Local 100 to file a disability-discrimination grievance; he alleged only that he asked Costales for help with the disciplinary matter.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claims

The court addressed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). It explained that a plaintiff generally must file a discrimination charge with the EEOC, receive a right-to-sue letter, and bring the federal lawsuit within 90 days after receiving that letter.

As to the ADA claim against NYCTA, Jackson had not provided the right-to-sue letter or its mailing date. Because the lawsuit was filed on June 6, 2019, the court stated that the letter needed to be dated on or after March 8, 2019 for the claim to be timely under the ordinary 90-day calculation. The court therefore could not find that the claim was timely based on the pleadings.

As to Akselrod, the court held that an individual employee cannot be personally liable under the ADA for the relief Jackson sought. As to TWU Local 100 and Costales, the court found that Jackson had not stated whether he presented his ADA claims to the EEOC or another applicable agency, so the court could not find that he had completed the required administrative process.

Title VII Claim

Jackson selected Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on a court employment-discrimination form, but he did not identify whether the alleged discrimination involved race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. He also did not allege facts supporting a Title VII discrimination claim or show that he had filed the required administrative case and obtained a right-to-sue letter. The court therefore dismissed the Title VII claim.

Disposition

The court granted both motions to dismiss. It dismissed all claims against TWU Local 100, Costales, and Akselrod with prejudice, and dismissed Jackson’s CHRL claim against NYCTA with prejudice. It dismissed Jackson’s ADA claim against NYCTA and his Title VII claim without prejudice to filing a motion for leave to submit a second amended complaint. The court set February 25, 2022 as the deadline for that motion and required Jackson to address any EEOC right-to-sue letter, including its date and a copy if available. The Clerk was directed to close the pending motions and mail the order to Jackson.