K.D. Hercules v. Laborers Local 78 of the Laborer's International Union of…

Background

K.D. Hercules, Inc., K.D. Hercules Group, Inc., and Kyriakos Diakou sued Laborers Local 78 of the Laborers’ International Union of North America and the Mason Tenders’ District Council of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in unlawful secondary activity under Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act and Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act. They also brought New York tort claims concerning alleged defamation.

Hercules had contracted with Riverbay Corporation to perform asbestos-abatement work at Co-op City. The contract and Hercules’s bid used union pricing. In 2019, Hercules ended its collective bargaining agreement with Local 78 and told Riverbay that it would continue the work as a non-union operation. Riverbay told Diakou that the contract required union work, declared the contract void, rebid the work, and awarded the replacement contract to a contractor that bid union rates.

The defendants also raised safety concerns about Hercules’s work. A union shop steward reported alleged safety violations, including inadequate containment and protective equipment. Riverbay officials separately documented safety concerns and warned that another incident could result in Hercules being removed from Riverbay projects. Between July and September 2019, Local 78 held protests involving large rat-shaped balloons and distributed a handbill calling Hercules a substandard and unsafe asbestos-abatement contractor.

Summary-Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is a procedure used to decide a case without a trial when the record shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, but required them to cite evidence supporting a genuine factual dispute.

Federal Labor-Law Claim

The court construed the complaint as alleging a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), which prohibits a labor organization from using threats, coercion, or restraint to force a person to stop doing business with another person. The related Section 303 claim required evidence that the unions threatened, coerced, or restrained someone; acted with the objective of causing a secondary employer to stop doing business with a primary employer; and proximately caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.

The court assumed, for purposes of the motion, that the plaintiffs might be able to establish the first two elements. It granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs lacked evidence of causation. The court held that no reasonable jury could find that Riverbay ended the contract because of the defendants’ safety complaints or protests. The protests began about three months after Riverbay terminated the contract. The record instead showed that Riverbay wanted union labor, understood the contract to require union work, and ended the contract after Hercules decided to operate as non-union.

The court also found no evidence that the defendants’ conduct caused Riverbay to award the replacement contract to another contractor. The plaintiffs had bid non-union prices on that replacement contract, while Riverbay was seeking a contractor that would perform union work. The plaintiffs’ evidence consisted of conclusory speculation and a contract that supported, rather than disproved, the defendants’ explanation.

The court further concluded that other provisions of Section 8(b)(4) did not support the claim. The plaintiffs identified no evidence that the union induced or encouraged employees to strike, and they did not allege or argue that Riverbay and the defendants entered into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e).

New York Tort Claims

The court dismissed the state-law tort claims under the rule from Martin v. Curran. That rule requires a plaintiff suing a voluntary, unincorporated labor union under New York law to plead and prove that every union member authorized or ratified the alleged wrongful conduct. The court found no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that every member of Local 78 and the Mason Tenders’ District Council ratified the protests or safety complaints. The plaintiffs’ assertion that Local 78 ratified its actions through meetings had no supporting evidence.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted. The court directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at Docket No. 64 and close the case.