Ross v. Dept. of the Army, US Army Reserve
- Laura Swain
- 1:21-cv-06239
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 6
In Ross v. Dept. of the Army, Judge Swain transferred the employment case to the Eastern District of New York because the events and records were tied to Staten Island.
Harold A. Ross and the defendants he sued, including the U.S. Army, the United States Army Reserve, Secretary of the Army Christine E. Wormuth, and Lieutenant General Jody J. Daniels. The case was transferred from the Southern District of New York to the Eastern District of New York.
What happened
In Ross v. Dept. of the Army, Harold A. Ross, who was proceeding without a lawyer, sued the U.S. Army and other defendants over alleged workplace discrimination and related employment-law violations. He said he worked in Staten Island and had been subjected to harassment, a hostile work environment, discrimination, and termination.
The court explained that New York federal courts were proper venues for Ross’s claims under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act because he worked in New York State. But Ross had not shown that a substantial part of the events supporting his Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Family and Medical Leave Act claims occurred in the Southern District of New York. The court nevertheless determined that transferring the entire case was appropriate because the events occurred in Staten Island and relevant records were likely kept there.
Judge Laura Taylor Swain ordered the Clerk to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The Southern District case was closed, no summons would issue from that court, and the transferee court would decide whether Ross could proceed without paying fees. The court also denied fee-free status for any appeal from the transfer order.
The detailed version
- Ross v. Dept. of the Army, US Army Reserve · No. 1:21-cv-06239
- Laura Swain
- Jan. 31, 2022
Background
Harold A. Ross was proceeding without a lawyer. He filed an employment-related action against the U.S. Army, the United States Army Reserve, Army Reserve officials, and certain Army officials. In his original complaint, he asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the U.S. Army took adverse action against him in 2018 by requiring him to waive his right to bring future discrimination charges.
In his second amended complaint, Ross asserted claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, a cited federal regulation, and New York State and City Human Rights Laws. He alleged that he was the only African-American civilian budget analyst over age 40 employed by Army Reserve Medical Command during the period identified in the complaint, and that he experienced harassment, a hostile work environment, disparate-treatment discrimination, and termination. He stated that he worked in Staten Island, filed a discrimination charge on August 19, 2019, and received a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on May 19, 2020.
Venue Analysis
The court explained that Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act use a specific employment-claim venue rule. Because Ross alleged that he worked in New York State, the court concluded that the Southern District of New York and every other federal district court in New York were proper venues for those claims.
The court said that Ross’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Family and Medical Leave Act claims were governed by the general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Ross had not alleged facts showing that a substantial part of the events supporting those claims occurred in the Southern District of New York. The court therefore concluded that the Southern District was not a proper venue for those claims under that provision. A footnote also stated that the rule based on where all defendants reside did not apply because all defendants did not reside in New York.
Transfer Decision
The court considered transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which permits a federal court to transfer a case for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. The court stated that it could order a transfer on its own initiative and considered the circumstances as a whole.
The court found that transfer was appropriate because the underlying events occurred in Staten Island, where Ross had been employed, and his employment records were likely maintained. Staten Island is in Richmond County, which lies within the Eastern District of New York. The court concluded that venue was proper there and that the interest of justice supported transferring the action.
Disposition
The court directed the Clerk to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. It stated that the transferee court would decide whether Ross could proceed without prepaying fees. The court ordered that no summons issue from the Southern District of New York and stated that the case was closed there. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal.
This was a venue and case-transfer order; the opinion did not decide whether Ross’s employment claims were legally or factually valid.
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.