Ramsaroop v. The Department of Education of The City of New York

Background

Michael Ramsaroop filed the action pro se against the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) and Shirley Miller. The United Federation of Teachers was previously voluntarily dismissed. Ramsaroop alleged that the defendants retaliated against him, discriminated against him, and violated his federal and state due-process rights in connection with disciplinary proceedings and his termination as a teacher.

Ramsaroop alleged that he refused to change failing student grades at the direction of a principal, received negative performance evaluations, filed a grievance, and later faced disciplinary charges. He also alleged that he was improperly required to sign an agreement concerning a disciplinary hearing and that Miller improperly approved probable cause for later charges. After a nine-day hearing, the hearing officer sustained the charges and recommended termination. A New York state court later dismissed Ramsaroop’s appeal of that decision.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, but it did not accept conclusory statements without supporting facts.

Discrimination claims

Ramsaroop asserted age-discrimination claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. He also asserted equal-protection claims under the federal and New York constitutions.

The defendants argued that the earlier disciplinary hearing and state-court appeal barred these claims under collateral estoppel, a rule that prevents relitigation of issues actually and necessarily decided in an earlier proceeding after a full and fair opportunity to litigate. The court rejected that argument because the earlier proceedings did not decide whether the disciplinary charges or termination were motivated by discrimination or retaliation.

The court nevertheless dismissed the discrimination and equal-protection claims for failure to state a claim. It found that Ramsaroop’s allegations that the defendants acted with age-based discrimination were conclusory and speculative. The court also rejected his argument that discrimination could be inferred merely because Miller knew his age before approving probable cause.

Due-process claims

Ramsaroop alleged that he was denied due process because there was no executive-session vote establishing probable cause and because he could not select the arbitrator. The court ruled that New York law no longer required the alleged board vote because authority could be delegated to principals. It also ruled that due process required notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond—protections the complaint showed Ramsaroop received. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the federal and state due-process claims.

Retaliation claims

Ramsaroop alleged retaliation for filing and winning a grievance and for refusing to change student grades. The court explained that a public employee’s speech is protected by the First Amendment only when the employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, rather than merely as part of the employee’s job or personal employment dispute.

The court found that Ramsaroop’s grievance concerned only his employment and that he had not sufficiently alleged that his refusal to change grades was speech by a private citizen on a matter of public concern. The court therefore dismissed his constitutional retaliation claims for failure to state a claim. The court did not address his separate claims under New York Labor Law § 740 or Civil Service Law § 75-b in this part of the opinion.

State-law claims

The court ruled that Ramsaroop’s state-law claims against the NYCDOE were time-barred because he filed the action after the applicable limitations periods. The court did not apply the same one-year period to claims against Miller, but it dismissed the claims against Miller that required a notice of claim because Ramsaroop did not allege that he had properly served one. A complaint itself did not satisfy the applicable notice requirement.

The court dismissed Ramsaroop’s New York Labor Law § 740 claim because that statute does not apply to public employers. It dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against the NYCDOE because public policy bars that claim against a governmental entity, and dismissed the claim against Miller as untimely. The negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was timely, but the alleged disciplinary actions and negative evaluations were not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to state a claim.

The court dismissed the breach-of-contract claim because Ramsaroop was not a party to the collective-bargaining agreement between the NYCDOE and the United Federation of Teachers, and the court concluded that he lacked standing to enforce that agreement individually.

Disposition and amendment

The court granted the motion to dismiss. It allowed Ramsaroop to file an amended complaint concerning the federal and state equal-protection claims, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law claims, and the First Amendment and New York constitutional retaliation claims. The court stated that amendment would be futile for the New York Labor Law § 740 claim; the claims against the NYCDOE for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, fraud, and breach of contract; the due-process claims; and the corresponding intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, fraud, and breach-of-contract claims against Miller. Ramsaroop’s deadline to amend, if at all, was March 8, 2022. Judge Edgardo Ramos directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion.