Pompey-Primus v. Success Academy Charter Schools, Inc.

Background

Sheri Pompey-Primus sued Success Academy Charter Schools, Inc. and Noreen Cooke-Coleman under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She alleged discrimination and retaliation based on sex and caregiver status. The opinion explains that her Title VII claims were based solely on sex discrimination.

Pompey-Primus worked as a lead teacher beginning in July 2016. During the shift to remote learning in March 2020, she told her manager that she would also care for her two children while working from home. Her manager told her she could briefly step away from the virtual classroom and use her co-teacher as a backup. Pompey-Primus alleged that she did so occasionally without a decline in performance or an objection from Success Academy.

On August 25, 2020, Cooke-Coleman told Pompey-Primus to obtain childcare so she could be “100% involved with work.” Cooke-Coleman said they would speak again after two weeks about the childcare search. Pompey-Primus alleged that she understood she would lose her job if she did not obtain childcare, but she did not allege that Cooke-Coleman expressly threatened to fire her. She could not find childcare, and her employment ended around September 15, 2020. The complaint did not explain the circumstances of the employment ending; her opposition brief said that she resigned.

Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court had previously allowed Pompey-Primus to amend, but she did not amend the complaint or request permission to amend.

Title VII discrimination claim

The court held that Pompey-Primus did not plausibly allege an adverse employment action. She relied on a constructive-discharge theory, meaning that an employer deliberately made working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign. The court found no plausible allegation that Cooke-Coleman intended to create an intolerable work environment. It also found that Pompey-Primus did not allege that her working conditions materially worsened: she was not alleged to have been barred from using her co-teacher as a backup, unable to perform her duties, subjected to additional childcare-related comments, reprimanded, demoted, or fired for failing to arrange childcare.

The court further noted that Cooke-Coleman did not expressly threaten termination, that Pompey-Primus continued working for three weeks after the conversation, and that the planned follow-up conversation could have given her an opportunity to explain her circumstances or seek help. These allegations did not plausibly show a forced resignation.

The court separately held that Pompey-Primus did not plausibly allege discriminatory intent. She did not allege that male teachers were allowed to step away to care for children while she was treated differently, or that defendants made specific sex-based remarks. The statement that she needed childcare to be fully involved at work, without additional facts linking it to her sex, did not support a plausible inference of discrimination.

Title VII retaliation claim

The court held that Pompey-Primus failed to state a retaliation claim for two independent reasons. First, the childcare statements did not amount to a materially adverse action because she did not allege that the statements changed her position, prevented her from caring for her children, or resulted in a reprimand, demotion, or termination. Second, she did not allege that she engaged in protected activity before the alleged retaliation. Protected activity includes opposing conduct prohibited by Title VII or participating in a discrimination charge or investigation. The complaint did not allege that Pompey-Primus complained about or opposed sex discrimination at Success Academy.

The court therefore granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims with prejudice. The opinion also states that the Title VII claims against Cooke-Coleman had to be dismissed because Title VII does not impose liability on individual defendants.

New York claims

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Supplemental jurisdiction is a court’s authority to hear related state-law claims alongside federal claims. The court explained that the state and city laws use different, more liberal standards and that some issues concerning constructive discharge under the city law were unsettled. It dismissed those claims without prejudice.

Leave to amend and disposition

The court denied leave to amend. Pompey-Primus had not amended after receiving an opportunity to do so, had not requested another amendment, and did not identify additional facts that would change the court’s analysis. The court concluded that the allegations supporting both federal claims were insufficient and that amendment was unlikely to make them plausible.

The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII claims with prejudice, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims and dismissed them without prejudice, denied leave to amend, terminated the pending motions, adjourned remaining dates, and closed the case.