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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Feb. 22, 2022

Finnegan v. Cubesmart

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:22-cv-00304
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
6
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissPro Se
In one sentence

In Finnegan v. Cubesmart, Judge Swain dismissed Sean Matthew Finnegan’s complaint, finding no viable debt-collection claim or federal jurisdiction for state claims.

Who this affects

Sean Matthew Finnegan’s federal FDCPA claim and any state-law claims he intended to assert were dismissed or declined under the court’s jurisdictional and complaint-screening rules; Cubesmart was the defendant.

What happened

In Finnegan v. Cubesmart, Sean Matthew Finnegan sued Cubesmart under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and also referred to a broken contract, harassment, threats, intimidation, and abuse. He did not provide facts describing what happened and sought hundreds of millions of dollars. The opinion states that both parties reside in New York.

The court concluded that Finnegan did not allege facts showing that Cubesmart was a debt collector covered by the federal law or that he owed Cubesmart a debt. It also found no basis for federal jurisdiction over the possible state-law claims because the parties were not citizens of different states. After dismissing the federal claim, the court declined to hear the state-law claims and found that amendment would be futile.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the complaint under the law governing complaints filed without upfront filing fees. The court also denied Finnegan that fee waiver for an appeal after certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Finnegan v. Cubesmart · No. 1:22-cv-00304
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
Feb. 22, 2022

Background

Sean Matthew Finnegan, appearing without a lawyer, sued Cubesmart under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). He also alleged that Cubesmart breached a contract and engaged in harassment, threats, intimidation, and abuse. The complaint did not describe the events underlying those allegations and sought hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. The opinion states that both parties reside in New York.

The court had previously allowed Finnegan to proceed without prepaying filing fees. It therefore reviewed the complaint under the statute requiring dismissal of such complaints that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, seek relief from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

FDCPA claim

Finnegan relied on Section 1692d of the FDCPA, which prohibits a covered debt collector from engaging in conduct whose natural consequence is to harass, oppress, or abuse someone while collecting a debt. The court explained that the law applies to certain consumer debts and to defendants that meet the statutory definition of a debt collector.

The court held that Finnegan alleged no facts showing that Cubesmart was a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA or that Finnegan owed Cubesmart a debt. The complaint therefore failed to state a viable FDCPA claim.

State-law claims and jurisdiction

To the extent Finnegan intended to assert breach-of-contract or other tort claims under state law, the court found that the complaint did not establish diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction generally requires the plaintiff and defendant to be citizens of different states and requires a claim exceeding $75,000. Because the complaint indicated that both Finnegan and Cubesmart reside in New York, the court found that complete diversity was absent.

The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s discretionary authority to hear related state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed—because it had dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction.

Leave to amend

The court stated that courts generally give an unrepresented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a defective complaint, but amendment is not required when it would be futile. It declined to grant Finnegan leave to amend because it found that the defects could not be cured through amendment. The court also considered Finnegan’s history of filing multiple FDCPA complaints in the district and noted that earlier orders had explained the requirements of an FDCPA claim. The opinion further states that Finnegan had recently been barred from filing complaints without prepaying fees unless he first obtained court permission.

Disposition

The court dismissed Finnegan’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Finnegan permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal. The clerk was directed to mail the order to Finnegan and note service on the docket.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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