Williams, Jr. v. City of New York
- Paul Gardephe
- 1:21-cv-01083
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 3
In Williams, Jr. v. City of New York, Magistrate Judge Parker denied Williams’s request for default judgments against several defendants.
The ruling affected Alexander Williams, Jr.’s request for default judgments against the listed defendants. ADW Carter was no longer a party, CO Edmunds remained a party pending a ruling on the recommendation to dismiss him, and the other listed defendants were treated as represented by defense counsel and as having moved to dismiss.
What happened
In Williams, Jr. v. City of New York, Alexander Williams, Jr., who represented himself, asked the court to enter default judgments against several correctional officers and other defendants in his civil-rights case. He argued that they had not responded to his complaint or obtained counsel.
The court found that default judgment was not appropriate. ADW Carter was no longer a party; CO Edmunds remained a party because a recommendation to dismiss him had not yet been decided; and the other defendants were identified in the notice of motion as represented by defense counsel and seeking dismissal.
Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker denied Williams’s request for default judgment and directed the Clerk of Court to mail him a copy of the opinion.
The detailed version
- Williams, Jr. v. City of New York · No. 1:21-cv-01083
- Paul Gardephe
- Feb. 23, 2022
Background
Alexander Williams, Jr., representing himself, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights while he was held as a pretrial detainee at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island. He asked the court to enter default judgments against Correction Officers Edmunds, Sharma, Omiblu, Emebu, Graves, and Coulthurst; ADW Carter; Captain Carter; and Dr. Blackmore. Williams argued that these defendants were not included in the defendants’ motion to dismiss, had not responded to the complaint, and did not appear to be represented by counsel.
Defendants’ counsel responded that CO Edmunds and ADW Carter were no longer parties or, as to Edmunds, had been dismissed. Counsel also stated that the remaining defendants may have been inadvertently omitted when the motion to dismiss was entered on the docket, but that all remaining defendants were listed in the notice of motion as represented by defense counsel and seeking dismissal.
Court’s analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a court may enter default judgment when a party fails to plead or otherwise defend. The court considered whether any failure was willful, whether the defendants had a potentially valid defense, and whether Williams would be harmed if default judgment were denied. The court emphasized that a good-faith mistake is not willful default, that courts generally prefer resolving disputes on their merits, and that default judgment is an extreme remedy.
The court held that default judgment was not appropriate against any listed defendant. ADW Carter had been terminated as a party in April 2021, so Williams’s request as to Carter failed as a matter of law. As to CO Edmunds, the court clarified that it had not dismissed him on its own initiative. Instead, the magistrate judge had issued a report and recommendation to Judge Paul G. Gardephe recommending dismissal, but Judge Gardephe had not yet ruled on it; therefore, Edmunds remained a party and should have appeared on the docket. For the other defendants, default was unwarranted because the notice of motion identified them as represented by defense counsel and as having moved to dismiss the action.
Disposition
Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker denied Williams’s request for default judgment. The Clerk of Court was directed to mail Williams a copy of the opinion. The opinion did not decide the merits of Williams’s underlying constitutional claims.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.