Cherner v. Westchester Jewish Community Services, Inc.

Background

Dan Cherner represented himself in this case against Kathleen McKay and Westchester Jewish Community Services, Inc. (WJCS). In 2016, New York State Family Court appointed McKay, a psychologist employed by or affiliated with WJCS, to conduct a forensic evaluation of Cherner and his family to assist with custody issues. Cherner alleged that the evaluation’s timing, methods, content, and conclusions were improper. He said that he and the other party were each ordered to pay McKay $7,500 for the evaluation.

Cherner’s amended complaint sought damages and injunctive relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. He alleged violations involving his custody of his children, family relationships, privacy, and related liberty interests. He also brought New York claims for fraud and negligent infliction of emotional distress and sought to represent an undefined class.

Federal Claims

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true but did not accept legal conclusions without supporting facts.

The court held that Cherner had not plausibly alleged that McKay or WJCS acted under color of state law. Section 1983 generally applies to conduct fairly attributable to the government, while private parties ordinarily are not liable under that statute. The court considered three possible ways private conduct could qualify as state action: government coercion or control, joint activity or a close connection with the government, and performance of a function delegated by the government.

The court found Cherner’s allegations that defendants were state actors conclusory. It concluded that he had not plausibly alleged that defendants’ conduct was coerced, controlled, encouraged, or joined by the Family Court, or that performing a psychological evaluation was a public function. Because McKay was a court-appointed psychologist, the court held that she was not a state actor and that WJCS was not a state actor either.

The court separately held that dismissal was required based on absolute quasi-judicial immunity, even assuming defendants were state actors. This form of immunity can protect nonjudicial persons who serve as an arm of the court or perform activities closely connected to court procedures. The court found that McKay’s alleged misconduct concerned how she performed her court-assigned evaluation, so McKay and WJCS were immune from suit for that conduct.

State-Law Claims and Amendment

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear related state-law claims in the same case. It stated that the considerations favoring federal courts’ deciding such claims did not support retaining them after the federal claims were eliminated. The court said it tended to agree that the allegations did not meet the requirements for fraud or negligent infliction of emotional distress, but it dismissed those claims without prejudice because it declined supplemental jurisdiction.

The court also declined to grant leave to amend the federal claims again. Cherner had already amended once after receiving notice of defendants’ arguments and the court’s observations at a pre-motion conference. The court found no indication that another amendment or additional facts would cure the defects.

Disposition

The court granted McKay’s and WJCS’s motions to dismiss, dismissed Cherner’s federal claims, dismissed the state-law fraud and negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims without prejudice, declined to grant further leave to amend, directed the clerk to terminate the pending motions, and closed the case.