New York SMSA Limited Partnership v. The Town of Carmel

Background

New York SMSA Limited Partnership, doing business as Verizon Wireless, and Homeland Towers, LLC sued the Town of Carmel, the Town of Carmel Town Board, the Town of Carmel Planning Board, the Town of Carmel Zoning Board of Appeals, the Town of Carmel Environmental Conservation Board, and Michael Carnazza, the Town’s Building Inspector. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ denial of requests to install and maintain two public-utility wireless telecommunications facilities violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

On May 20, 2020, the parties entered a court-approved settlement and Consent Order providing for construction of the facilities. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the federal action on May 26, 2020, and the case remained closed.

Six Town residents—Jessica Gondolfo, Robert Cavallaro, Todd McCormack, Edward Wechsler, Joseph Armisto, and Gerard Hanrahan—later brought a proceeding in New York State Supreme Court seeking, among other things, to vacate the Consent Order and have it declared invalid. They also sought emergency and preliminary relief related to construction. That state-court proceeding was removed to federal court and later sent back to state court. The state court subsequently stayed its proceeding while the federal motions were pending.

Motions and Arguments

The residents moved in the closed federal case for relief from the Consent Order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (3), (4), and (6). They argued that the order was issued because of mistake, surprise, or misrepresentation, that it was void, and that other circumstances justified relief. They also argued that their motion was timely because it was filed exactly one year after entry of the Consent Order, they were not parties to the federal action, and they had already sought relief in state court.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that it was not filed within a reasonable time, would cause undue hardship, and lacked the highly convincing evidence required for relief. The plaintiffs also filed a cross-motion for a declaratory judgment stating that the Consent Order and resulting permits were legally valid.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order in specified circumstances, including mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud or misconduct, a void judgment, satisfaction of the judgment, or other reasons justifying relief. Although nonparties may invoke the rule in extraordinary circumstances, such relief is generally disfavored. A motion must be made within a reasonable time, and the moving party generally must show good cause for not acting sooner.

The court held that the residents’ motion was untimely. The residents knew about the Consent Order by October 14, 2020, when they began the state-court proceeding. They then waited seven months after that known date before filing the federal Rule 60(b) motion. The court found that their stated purpose—to preserve their rights while the state litigation proceeded—was a deliberate litigation strategy, not good cause for the delay. The court therefore denied the motion for relief from judgment without reaching the residents’ other grounds for vacating the Consent Order.

The court separately held that the plaintiffs’ declaratory-judgment request was procedurally improper. A declaratory judgment is sought through an ordinary civil action, not through a motion, and the request was especially inappropriate because the federal case was already closed and no existing claim remained on which to seek that relief. The court therefore denied the cross-motion.

Disposition

The court denied the residents’ motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). It denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for declaratory judgment. It also denied the plaintiffs’ request for oral argument as unnecessary and directed the Clerk to terminate the motion sequences at Documents 27 and 32.