Hubbell-Petang v. Hotel Reservation Service, Inc

Background

Anna Hubbell-Petang sued Hotel Reservation Service, Inc. (HRS) and Alexandra Benakis. She alleged gender- and pregnancy-based employment discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the New York State Human Rights Law. She also asserted a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Hubbell-Petang alleged that HRS did not properly accommodate her pregnancy and lactation needs, subjected her to unfair work demands and scrutiny, and retaliated against her after she complained and requested leave. She alleged that HRS terminated her on April 10, 2020, after she requested leave to address parenting responsibilities. The defendants stated that the termination was related to the coronavirus pandemic, while Hubbell-Petang alleged that it was caused by her leave request.

Motion to Transfer Venue

The defendants sought to transfer the case to the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a statute allowing transfer when another federal district would be more convenient and serve the interests of justice. The defendants had to show by clear and convincing evidence that the balance of convenience strongly favored Texas.

The court acknowledged that many operative facts occurred in Texas, including Hubbell-Petang’s work, alleged accommodation problems, lactation issues, and termination. But the court found that the defendants did not show that Texas would be more convenient for the witnesses or parties. The parties disputed the significance of their proposed witnesses, HRS’s documents were stored electronically, and one defendant lived closer to New York than to Texas. The court also gave significant weight to Hubbell-Petang’s choice of forum because the defendants had not shown that the other factors strongly favored transfer.

The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion to transfer the case.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants also moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally sufficient claim. The motion concerned Hubbell-Petang’s New York State Human Rights Law claims and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The opinion states that granting this motion resulted in Benakis’s dismissal from the action.

New York State Human Rights Law claims. The court applied the rule that a nonresident generally must show that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact in New York. Hubbell-Petang’s complaint alleged that Benakis lived in New York and that some decisions, including the termination decision, occurred there. The court held that those allegations were insufficient because Hubbell-Petang did not allege that she worked physically in New York, traveled there for work, or was physically present there during her employment.

Hubbell-Petang later submitted a declaration stating that she had discussed possibly transitioning to a position in New York City and had sent her résumé to HRS’s human-resources manager. The court declined to decide whether that declaration was procedurally proper, but held that the claims failed even considering the argument. The court concluded that the alleged end of discussions about a possible transfer did not prevent her from formally applying for a New York position and did not establish the required New York impact. The court dismissed each of her New York State Human Rights Law claims.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court analyzed this claim under both Texas and New York law. Under Texas law, the court held that the claim was barred because Hubbell-Petang based it on conduct for which she could bring employment-discrimination or sexual-harassment claims. Under New York law, the court held that the alleged lack of pregnancy and lactation accommodations, unfair work demands and scrutiny, and termination did not rise to the level of conduct so extreme and outrageous that it could support this tort claim. The court stated that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim had to be dismissed without prejudice.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that the motion to transfer was denied and the motion to dismiss counts 6–10 was granted. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the motions.