Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
←Back to docket
S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Mar. 8, 2022

Williams v. United States

Judge
Nelson Roman
Docket
7:21-cv-06624
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
10
HabeasCriminalSentencingPro Se
In one sentence

In Williams v. United States, Judge Roman denied Williams’s request to undo his sentence, finding he had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel.

Who this affects

Jihad Williams, whose motion to vacate his conviction or sentence was denied; the United States of America, which opposed the motion.

What happened

In Williams v. United States, Jihad Williams asked the court to set aside his sentence because he said his lawyer gave him incorrect information during plea negotiations and before sentencing. Williams had pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering conspiracy and received a 180-month prison sentence.

Williams said his lawyer promised him a much shorter sentence, failed to explain that he could be held responsible for additional conduct, miscalculated his likely sentence, and failed to object properly to the sentencing report. The court reviewed the plea agreement, sentencing report, hearing transcripts, and the lawyer’s sworn statement. It found that Williams had been warned about the possible sentence, understood that the court had discretion, and entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.

Judge Nelson S. Roman denied Williams’s request to vacate his conviction or sentence under the federal post-conviction statute. The court concluded that Williams had not shown that his lawyer’s performance was deficient or that it caused him prejudice, and it terminated the related civil action.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Williams v. United States · No. 7:21-cv-06624
Judge
Nelson Roman
Date
Mar. 8, 2022

Background

Jihad Williams was charged with participating in a racketeering conspiracy, a narcotics conspiracy, and possessing firearms in furtherance of the narcotics conspiracy. On February 28, 2019, he pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering conspiracy under a plea agreement. On July 30, 2019, the court sentenced him to 180 months in prison followed by supervised release.

Williams filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal procedure allowing a person in custody to challenge a sentence on specified constitutional or legal grounds. He claimed that his lawyer, Howard Tanner, provided ineffective assistance during the pretrial process and plea negotiations.

Williams’s claims

Williams alleged that Tanner:

- failed to tell him that he could be held responsible for additional criminal conduct covered by the racketeering conspiracy; - guaranteed or promised a sentence of two or three years, or a sentence shorter than those of two codefendants; - failed to make several objections to the presentence report; - failed to explain the plea and sentencing plan adequately; - misinformed him about how his sentence would be calculated; and - lied about the consequences of pleading guilty.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams had to show both that Tanner’s performance fell below reasonable professional standards and that the alleged errors caused prejudice. Because Williams pleaded guilty, he also had to show a reasonable probability that, without the alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have gone to trial.

The court found that the record did not support Williams’s allegations. Tanner negotiated two possible plea agreements. One allowed Williams to plead guilty to racketeering conspiracy with a possible sentence ranging from zero to 240 months and possible credit for time served on a related state sentence. The other involved a weapons charge with a 60-month Guidelines sentence to run consecutively to the state sentence. Tanner stated in a sworn affidavit that he discussed both options with Williams and warned him that the racketeering agreement covered stipulated overt acts, including a murder committed by others, narcotics distribution, and a leadership-role enhancement.

The written plea agreement stated that the stipulated Guidelines sentence was 240 months and that the sentencing court could impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum. Williams agreed not to directly appeal or collaterally challenge a sentence at or below 240 months. The court imposed 180 months, which was below the stipulated Guidelines sentence.

The court also relied on the plea-hearing record. Williams stated that he had enough opportunity to consult with Tanner, was satisfied with Tanner’s services, understood that the charged offense carried a maximum sentence of 20 years, and understood that the court could impose a sentence higher or lower than the Guidelines range. The court expressly warned that any prediction by a lawyer or another person could be wrong and that Williams would remain bound by his guilty plea even if the sentence differed from his expectations. Williams said he understood.

The court rejected Williams’s argument that his statements during the plea hearing were merely scripted by Tanner. It found no credible evidence in the transcript that Tanner told Williams he would receive only a short sentence for selling marijuana. The court also found that Williams’s admissions during the plea hearing supported the elements of the racketeering-conspiracy charge.

As to sentencing, the court found that Tanner reviewed the final presentence report with Williams and explained that the court—not the lawyer or the government—would determine the ultimate sentence. Although Williams expressed confusion after receiving the 180-month sentence, the court concluded that the confusion did not establish ineffective assistance. The court found that Williams had been counseled multiple times that the sentence was within the court’s discretion and could fall anywhere from zero to 240 months under the agreement’s Guidelines calculation.

Disposition

The court denied Williams’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. It also directed the Clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 398 and terminate the No. 21-CV-6624 action. The opinion does not state that the motion was denied with or without prejudice.

The authoritative version

Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.