Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York
- Lewis Liman
- 1:22-cv-01585
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
In Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Judge Liman dissolved the state-court temporary restraining order because it failed federal procedural requirements and plaintiffs did not justify continued relief.
Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz lost the temporary court order that had restrained the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from terminating their employment pending a hearing; the bank was no longer subject to that restraint.
What happened
In Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, employees Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz challenged the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s COVID-19 vaccination policy and obtained a state-court order temporarily preventing their termination.
After the case moved to federal court, the bank argued that the temporary order did not meet federal requirements. The court agreed that the plaintiffs had not shown immediate, irreparable harm before the bank could be heard, had not adequately explained why advance notice should not be required, and had not shown that continued relief was justified.
Judge Liman dissolved the temporary restraining order because it was improperly issued under the federal rules and because the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm or a likelihood of success. The court did not decide whether the vaccination policy was lawful.
The detailed version
- Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York · No. 1:22-cv-01585
- Lewis Liman
- Mar. 11, 2022
Background
Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz are employed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Gardner-Alfred is an executive assistant to the bank’s executive vice president, and Diaz is a senior executive specialist. They challenged the bank’s COVID-19 vaccination policy in New York State Supreme Court, alleging that the policy was discriminatory, arbitrary, and unsupported by scientific facts. They alleged that the bank initially accepted their requests for religious exemptions but later required them to become vaccinated or face termination.
The state court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order, meaning an order issued without first hearing from the opposing party. The order restrained the bank from terminating the plaintiffs’ employment pending a hearing. The bank removed the action to federal court and moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order and dismiss the complaint.
Reasoning
The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, rather than New York procedural law, governed the request to dissolve the order after removal. Under Rule 65, a temporary restraining order issued without notice requires specific facts showing that immediate and irreparable injury will occur before the opposing party can be heard. The party seeking the order must also explain efforts to provide notice and why notice should not be required.
The court found that the plaintiffs’ affidavits did not clearly show immediate and irreparable injury. The immediate harm they identified was the potential loss of their jobs and income, which the court said generally can be remedied through money damages. The plaintiffs had also known weeks in advance when their employment could end and did not explain why they could not have sought relief earlier. Their affidavits described efforts to notify the bank but did not explain why notice should not have been required.
The court also found that the state-court order itself failed to satisfy Rule 65’s content requirements. Although it stated the date it was issued, it did not state the hour, explain why the alleged injury was irreparable, or explain why the order was issued without notice.
The court further concluded that the plaintiffs had not justified continued injunctive relief. A temporary restraining order generally requires a showing of likely success on the merits, irreparable harm, favorable balancing of hardships, and consistency with the public interest. The court said the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm or a likelihood of success. It also noted that their operative pleadings did not assert claims under the constitutional right to freely practice religion, even though their arguments relied on cases involving that right.
Disposition
The court dissolved the temporary restraining order as improperly issued under Rule 65. The order does not separately state a disposition of the bank’s request to dismiss the complaint. The court’s ruling addressed the temporary restraining order and did not decide the underlying legality of the bank’s vaccination policy.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.