Carroll v. Trump

Background

E. Jean Carroll brought a defamation action against Donald J. Trump in his personal capacity. Trump moved for permission to amend his answer to add an affirmative defense and a counterclaim under New York’s amended anti-SLAPP law. Anti-SLAPP laws are intended to deter lawsuits brought to punish or harass people for participating in public life. Trump’s proposed defense stated that Carroll’s claim was barred by New York’s anti-SLAPP statutes. His proposed counterclaim sought damages and other relief based on the allegation that Carroll’s lawsuit was baseless and brought for harassment or other improper purposes.

The United States previously removed the case from state court and sought to replace Trump with the United States as the defendant. The court denied that substitution request, and that ruling was pending appeal when this opinion was issued.

Futility of the Proposed Amendment

The court explained that a proposed amendment is futile when it would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. The court therefore concluded that it could, and should, examine the legal sufficiency of Trump’s proposed defense and counterclaim when deciding whether to allow the amendment.

The court held that the proposed affirmative defense was legally insufficient. An affirmative defense must assert new facts or arguments that, if true, would defeat the plaintiff’s claim even if the complaint’s allegations were accepted as true. Trump’s proposed defense asserted only that New York’s anti-SLAPP law barred Carroll’s claim. The court reasoned that, if Carroll’s allegations were true, her action would not have been brought or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law. The anti-SLAPP law therefore would not defeat her complaint on those assumed facts.

The court also concluded that the proposed counterclaim could not rely on the relevant New York anti-SLAPP provisions in federal court. Federal procedural rules govern procedure in federal court when they address the same issue as a state-law provision. The court found that the anti-SLAPP provisions’ heightened standards for dismissal and summary judgment, consideration of affidavits, and related procedures conflicted with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56. The court therefore concluded that those state-law procedures were not applicable in this federal case. It agreed with another Southern District of New York decision that the anti-SLAPP provision authorizing costs and attorney’s fees was also inapplicable because its “substantial basis” standard conflicted with the federal rules.

Delay, Bad Faith, and Prejudice

The court separately found that the motion could be denied because Trump waited approximately 14 months after the amended anti-SLAPP law took effect before seeking permission to amend. It found that Trump had not provided a satisfactory explanation for that delay. The court also relied on its view that Trump’s litigation conduct had delayed the case, that the proposed amendment could open additional avenues for delay, and that allowing the amendment would unduly prejudice Carroll. The court described the motion as made at least partly for a dilatory purpose and therefore at least partly in bad faith.

Disposition

Judge Lewis A. Kaplan denied Trump’s motion, in his personal capacity, for leave to amend. The court denied the motion on the ground that the proposed amendment would be futile. Alternatively, it denied the motion because Trump delayed unduly, the motion was made at least partly for a dilatory purpose and at least partly in bad faith, and granting the motion would unduly prejudice Carroll. The opinion addressed whether Trump could add the proposed defense and counterclaim; it did not decide the underlying defamation claim.