Rosario v. Social Security

Background

Gladys Rosario sought judicial review under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The administrative law judge (ALJ), Jack Russak, found that Rosario was not disabled. The Appeals Council later denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Rosario alleged that the ALJ applied an improper legal standard, particularly when evaluating her mental impairments. She asked the court either to reverse the denial and award benefits or to send the matter back to the Commissioner for another hearing. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a procedure allowing judgment based on the parties’ written submissions when no material factual dispute exists.

The ALJ found that Rosario had several severe impairments, including left shoulder calcific tendonitis, diabetes mellitus, hyperglycemia, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. The ALJ determined that she could perform medium work in a low-stress environment, with occasional decision-making and judgment, occasional workplace changes, no fast-paced work, no public interaction, and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. The ALJ concluded that Rosario could not return to her past relevant work but could perform other jobs, including machine operator and food service worker.

Issues and Analysis

The court applied the Social Security Act’s substantial-evidence standard. Under that standard, the court could overturn the Commissioner’s decision if the ALJ used an incorrect legal standard or if the decision lacked substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support the conclusion.

The court held that the ALJ correctly applied the newer regulations governing medical opinions. Those regulations do not require an ALJ to give controlling weight to a treating medical source. Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of medical opinions, particularly their supportability and consistency with the record.

The court found that the ALJ adequately evaluated the opinion of Kimberly Rubino, a physician’s assistant who treated Rosario. The ALJ found part of Rubino’s opinion persuasive and incorporated its limitations into the residual functional capacity (RFC), which is the most a person can still do despite her impairments. The court also noted that Rosario incorrectly described Rubino as a psychiatrist.

The court agreed with the ALJ that Rubino’s treatment records showed essentially normal mental-status examinations and improvement with medication. It concluded that comparing Rubino’s opinion with her treatment notes adequately addressed the supportability factor. The court also found that the ALJ properly considered whether Rubino’s opinion was consistent with the broader record, including Rosario’s statements, testimony, daily activities, consultative examination, and other medical evidence.

The court rejected Rosario’s arguments that her improvement was only temporary, that the ALJ failed to identify evidence supporting the RFC, and that the ALJ improperly evaluated her subjective complaints. The court found that the ALJ considered her reported depression, anxiety, panic attacks, sleep problems, and hallucinations but reasonably determined that the alleged severity of her symptoms was not entirely consistent with the treatment records and opinion evidence. The ALJ also properly considered activities such as using public transportation, socializing with her cousin, maintaining contact with her children, watching television, and using social media.

The court recognized that some evidence could support a different RFC but explained that it could not reweigh the evidence or replace the ALJ’s judgment where the record permitted more than one reasonable interpretation. It concluded that the ALJ used the correct legal standard and that the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence.

Disposition

Judge Sarah L. Cave denied Rosario’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court directed the clerk to close the two motions and the case.