Turk v. Rubbermaid Incorporated

Background

Lori Marie Turk and Luann Rutherford brought a proposed class action against Rubbermaid Incorporated concerning two coolers: the 102-Quart Marine Chest Cooler and the 45-Quart DuraChill Cooler. The plaintiffs alleged that Rubbermaid’s labeling represented that the coolers would retain ice for five days, while the coolers allegedly failed to retain ice for that long under ordinary use and did not keep food at or below 40 degrees Fahrenheit beyond two days. Rutherford also alleged that the DuraChill Cooler had hinge problems.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, common-law breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and unjust enrichment. They also sought injunctive relief requiring correction of the alleged misrepresentations. Turk alleged that she purchased the Marine Cooler from Walmart for no less than $109.99. Rutherford alleged that she purchased the DuraChill Cooler from CVS for no less than $45.00.

Rubbermaid moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Rulings on Injunctive Relief

The court dismissed all claims for injunctive relief with prejudice. It held that the plaintiffs had abandoned those claims by failing to address Rubbermaid’s arguments about them in their opposition brief. The court also held that, as past purchasers, the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek an order protecting them from future deception. The court explained that past purchasers generally cannot show a real and immediate threat of being deceived again because they already know the information they claim was missing from the labels.

New York General Business Law Claims

The court dismissed the claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350. It found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged consumer-oriented conduct because Rubbermaid marketed and sold the products through multiple retailers. But the court held that the labels were not materially misleading as a matter of law.

The DuraChill label stated that the cooler retained ice for “5 days” and included an asterisk referring to performance at 90 degrees Fahrenheit “under test conditions.” The Marine Cooler label stated, “Keeps Ice – Up to 5 Days at 90° F.” The court held that no reasonable consumer could interpret those statements as promising that the coolers would always retain ice for a full five days under normal use or would maintain food-safe temperatures for five days. The court also noted that the labels did not represent how long the products would maintain a food-safe temperature.

The court separately held that the plaintiffs failed to plead injury adequately. Their allegations that they relied on representations on the products and retailer websites were conclusory. The complaint did not adequately allege that they actually saw or knew of the challenged statements before buying the products. The claims under §§ 349 and 350 were therefore subject to dismissal for this additional reason.

Warranty Claims

The court dismissed the express-warranty claim because the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that they gave Rubbermaid pre-suit notice of the alleged breach. The complaint stated generally that notice had been or would be provided and that Rubbermaid should have known about the problems through complaints, but it did not provide facts such as when or how the plaintiffs notified Rubbermaid. The court did not separately decide Rubbermaid’s argument that Turk had not alleged a defect covered by the one-year warranty for defects in materials and workmanship. It stated that any separate claim based on that warranty had also been abandoned because the plaintiffs did not address it in their opposition.

The court dismissed the implied-warranty claim because the plaintiffs bought the coolers from retailers rather than Rubbermaid. Under the New York law applied by the court, a remote purchaser who alleges only economic loss generally cannot recover against a manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty without contractual privity, meaning a direct contractual relationship with the manufacturer.

The court dismissed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim because that federal statute depends on a viable state-law claim for breach of an express or implied warranty, and the court had dismissed both warranty claims.

Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraud

The court dismissed the negligent-misrepresentation claim because the plaintiffs did not plead a special relationship with Rubbermaid. New York law limits this claim to circumstances involving a relationship of trust, special expertise, or a relationship close to direct contractual privity. The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that Rubbermaid was a “global leader” and held itself out as having special knowledge and experience were unsupported general statements. The fact that Rubbermaid manufactured the coolers and placed statements on their labels was not enough.

The court dismissed the fraud claim because the plaintiffs did not plead fraudulent intent with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The allegation that Rubbermaid knew the products’ abilities were inconsistent with the labels was conclusory, and Rubbermaid’s general desire to increase sales and profits did not establish a strong inference of fraudulent intent.

Unjust Enrichment

The court dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim as duplicative. The claim relied on the same factual allegations as the plaintiffs’ statutory, warranty, and tort claims, and the plaintiffs did not allege distinct damages for unjust enrichment.

Disposition

The court granted Rubbermaid’s motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims was without prejudice because this was the first adjudication of those claims on the merits. The exception was the claim for injunctive relief, which was dismissed with prejudice. The court allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to file a second amended complaint if they had a good-faith basis to do so, warning that failure to amend properly and on time would result in dismissal of the claims with prejudice.