Charles v. Seinfeld
- Alison Nathan
- 1:18-cv-01196
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 21
In Charles v. Seinfeld, Judge Nathan granted in part defendants’ fee motion, awarding $28,842 and making Charles’s counsel jointly and severally liable.
The defendants receive $28,750 in attorneys’ fees and $92 in costs from Charles and his counsel, Peter Skolnik, who are jointly and severally liable. Charles may pay in equal monthly installments over ten years, and the award carries mandatory post-judgment interest.
What happened
In Charles v. Seinfeld, Christian Charles brought copyright claims against Jerry Seinfeld and related defendants concerning the show Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. The court had dismissed the claims as filed too late, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The defendants then sought $872,939.66 in attorneys’ fees and $100,918.71 in costs.
The court denied Charles’s attempt to reconsider its earlier conclusion that his claims were objectively unreasonable. It found that the requested fees and costs were excessive, reduced the attorneys’ hours by 50 percent, rejected certain costs, and calculated a reasonable award of $287,500 in fees and $920.27 in costs. Considering Charles’s limited financial resources and the defendants’ greater resources, the court reduced the award further.
Judge Alison J. Nathan granted in part the defendants’ motion and awarded $28,750 in attorneys’ fees and $92 in costs, for a total of $28,842. Charles and his counsel, Peter Skolnik, are jointly and severally liable, meaning either or both may be required to pay the award. The award also carries required interest, and Charles may pay in equal monthly installments over ten years.
The detailed version
- Charles v. Seinfeld · No. 1:18-cv-01196
- Alison Nathan
- Mar. 25, 2022
Background
Christian Charles asserted copyright claims against Jerry Seinfeld and several related defendants concerning Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. The court previously dismissed Charles’s second amended complaint because his claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The court found that Charles had been on notice of his claims since at least 2012 but did not sue until 2018. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal on June 18, 2020.
The defendants sought attorneys’ fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505. They initially requested $872,939.66 in attorneys’ fees and $100,918.71 in costs, totaling $973,858.37. The court had already determined that Charles’s claims were objectively unreasonable and that other factors favored a fee award. It then required briefing on the amount of the award, including the parties’ relative financial resources.
Reconsideration request
Charles used part of his brief to challenge the earlier finding that his claims were objectively unreasonable. The court treated that portion of the brief as a motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3. It denied the request because Charles repeated arguments and authorities the court had already considered and rejected. The court also maintained that the statute of limitations prevented the case from proceeding to discovery and that the cited decisions did not provide a reasonable basis for concluding that the claims were timely.
Calculation of fees and costs
The court evaluated the fee request using the lodestar method, which multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours worked. Although the defendants’ lawyers’ standard rates reflected what their clients paid for comparable work, the court found those rates too high compared with rates awarded in similar copyright cases in the district. It set lower rates for the attorneys and awarded $150 per hour for litigation-support staff and $200 per hour for paralegals and the managing attorney because the defendants provided no information about those staff members’ education or experience.
The defendants requested compensation for 1,465.9 hours worked by attorneys, paralegals, and support staff. The court found the hours excessive, citing duplication in successive motions to dismiss, excessive time spent preparing fee motions, multiple attorneys attending arguments, and overbilling on relatively straightforward matters. The records also used block billing, meaning multiple tasks were combined into single time entries that made it difficult to evaluate the time spent on each task. The court reduced the defendants’ hours across the board by 50 percent.
The court denied reimbursement for electronic legal research because that expense was already reflected in the attorneys’ hourly rates and research time. It also denied electronic discovery database hosting costs because the case did not proceed to discovery. The court reduced copying and mailing-related costs by 50 percent because the defendants did not adequately explain those expenses. After these adjustments, the court calculated a presumptively reasonable award of $287,500 in attorneys’ fees and $920.27 in costs.
Equitable reduction and counsel’s liability
The court then applied an equitable reduction based on the parties’ financial circumstances. Charles stated that his income had collapsed, that he had reported only $1,000 in income during the four years before filing suit, and that he had no liquid assets. The court found that his financial situation was precarious. It also found that the defendants were financially thriving and that the disparity between the parties’ resources was vast. The court concluded that a smaller award would still deter future misconduct and meaningfully compensate the defendants without causing Charles financial ruin.
The defendants also requested that Charles’s counsel be held jointly and severally liable. The court found that Charles’s claims lacked a colorable basis, meaning they lacked any legal or factual basis, and inferred that counsel acted in bad faith because the claims were completely without merit. The court emphasized that counsel continued the litigation despite repeated warnings and controlling authority, and that Charles relied on counsel’s advice. The court therefore held Charles’s counsel, Peter Skolnik, jointly and severally liable for the award assessed against Charles.
Disposition
Judge Alison J. Nathan granted in part the defendants’ motion for fees. The court reduced the presumptively reasonable attorneys’ fee by 90 percent and awarded $28,750 in attorneys’ fees and $92 in costs, for a total of $28,842. The award includes mandatory post-judgment interest at the rate specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), running from the date of judgment. Charles and Peter Skolnik are jointly and severally liable for payment. Charles may pay the award in equal monthly installments over ten years, and the Clerk of Court was directed to enter judgment.
Read the full 21-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.