Rabadi v. City of Yonkers

Background

Joseph Rabadi alleged that Andy Andrews shot him while Rabadi was sitting in his leased Chevrolet Malibu in Yonkers on December 7, 2020. Police arrested Andrews, took Rabadi to a hospital, and impounded the car. Rabadi alleged that Assistant District Attorney Brian Bendish refused to authorize the car’s release unless Rabadi provided hospital records and a sworn statement to help prosecute Andrews. Rabadi said he refused to cooperate.

Rabadi further alleged that Bendish later told GM that the car was impounded because of unpaid parking tickets and judgments. GM allegedly obtained the car in April 2021, before the deadline in a letter that gave Rabadi time to make payments associated with an alleged lease default. Rabadi sued the City of Yonkers, District Attorney Miriam E. Rocah in her official capacity, Bendish, GM, County Auto & Towing North, Inc., and Location Services, LLC. The opinion addresses the DA Defendants’ motion to dismiss the third amended complaint and GM’s motion to dismiss part of that complaint. The court treated well-pleaded allegations as true for purposes of these motions; it did not make factual findings about whether the allegations were true.

Rulings on Claims Against DA Rocah

The court dismissed Rabadi’s Section 1983 claims against Rocah because the complaint did not plausibly allege that a Westchester County policy or custom caused the alleged injuries. The court also dismissed any Section 1983 conspiracy claims against her on the same basis.

The court dismissed Rabadi’s declaratory-judgment claims against Rocah for lack of standing. Those claims relied on past injuries, including the alleged deprivation of the car, the alleged effort to obtain Rabadi’s cooperation, and towing and storage fees. The court concluded that Rabadi did not allege a likely future injury that declaratory relief could address.

The court also dismissed the state-law claims against Rocah for failure to comply with New York’s notice-of-claim requirements. The court concluded that Rabadi served his notice of claim after filing the original complaint and that later amended complaints did not correct that defect. The court’s conclusion resulted in all claims against Rocah being dismissed, and the clerk was instructed to terminate her from the action.

Rulings on Claims Against ADA Bendish

The court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity protected Bendish from the Section 1983 claims seeking damages based on his alleged retention of Rabadi’s car until Rabadi agreed to cooperate. The court reasoned that the alleged effort to control a witness’s cooperation was connected to Bendish’s prosecutorial function and that the complaint itself alleged a colorable basis for retaining the car as evidence.

The court did not apply absolute immunity to claims based on Bendish’s alleged role in releasing the car to GM. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the allegations plausibly suggested that Bendish had stopped acting as an advocate gathering evidence and had instead acted as an administrator of property that was no longer needed. The court also concluded that allegedly lying to GM to cause an unlawful repossession would be outside Bendish’s authority as a prosecutor.

The court allowed Rabadi’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Bendish to proceed. It held that Rabadi plausibly alleged a limited First Amendment right to refuse to cooperate with Bendish, adverse action through the alleged transfer of the car to GM, and a connection between the refusal and that action.

The court dismissed Rabadi’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due-process claim based on the alleged loss of the car. It characterized the alleged deprivation as random and unauthorized and concluded that New York provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy, including state-law claims for replevin or conversion. The court also dismissed the substantive due-process claim because an alleged property interest in a vehicle is not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process.

The court dismissed the state-law claims against Bendish for neither failure to comply with the notice-of-claim requirements nor other grounds at this stage. Because the parties had not briefed whether Westchester County was required to indemnify Bendish, the court declined to grant the motion as to those claims. The claims for conversion, trespass of chattel, and wrongful repossession could proceed, without prejudice to the DA Defendants renewing their notice-of-claim arguments on summary judgment.

Rulings on Claims Against GM

The court granted GM’s motion to dismiss in part. It dismissed Rabadi’s Section 1983 due-process claim against GM because, even assuming GM was a state actor, New York’s available post-deprivation remedies barred the claim.

The court dismissed Rabadi’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege that GM was a “debt collector.” The complaint did not allege that collecting debts was GM’s principal business purpose, and the lease identified GM as the assignee, suggesting that any debt was owed to GM itself rather than to another creditor.

The court dismissed Rabadi’s claim under New York General Business Law Section 349 because the alleged early repossession involved a single incident and the complaint did not plausibly allege conduct directed at consumers generally or harm to the public interest. GM’s remaining state-law claims for conversion, trespass of chattel, and wrongful repossession were not part of its motion and could proceed.

Disposition

The DA Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The First Amendment retaliation claim against Bendish based on the alleged repossession and the state-law claims against Bendish could proceed; all other claims against Bendish were dismissed, and all claims against Rocah were dismissed. GM’s motion to dismiss in part was granted, while the remaining state-law claims against GM could proceed. Bendish and GM were ordered to answer by April 8, 2022.