Herrera v. United States of America

Background

Karilie Herrera, Franchesca Morales, and Carolyn Richardson alleged that Colin Akparanta, a former correctional officer at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, sexually abused them on multiple occasions in 2017 and 2018 while they were in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. The complaint alleged that Akparanta had abused inmates for years and that other Bureau of Prisons employees knew or should have suspected what was happening but failed to investigate, report, discipline, or stop him.

The plaintiffs asserted constitutional claims against Akparanta and other individual defendants under Bivens, which permits damages claims in some circumstances for constitutional violations by federal officials acting in their individual capacities. They also asserted claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision. The United States and six individual defendants—Norman Reid, Ronald West, Stacey Harris, Shakiyl Collier, Troylinda Hill, and Nicole Lewis—moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) concerns the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, while Rule 12(b)(6) concerns whether a complaint adequately states a legally plausible claim.

Bivens Claims

The court held that the plaintiffs’ Bivens claims against the six moving individual defendants arose in a “new context.” Although an earlier Supreme Court case recognized a Bivens remedy for a federal inmate’s inadequate-medical-care claim, the court found that protecting inmates from repeated sexual abuse by another Bureau of Prisons employee was meaningfully different. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on cases defining deliberate indifference, explaining that those cases did not themselves extend the Bivens remedy to this type of claim.

The court identified special factors counseling against creating a Bivens remedy in this context. In particular, the plaintiffs had an alternative potential remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and Congress had addressed prisoner abuse through the Prison Litigation Reform Act without creating a general damages remedy for this type of mistreatment. The court therefore declined to extend Bivens and granted the motion as to the Bivens claims against Reid, West, Harris, Collier, Hill, and Lewis.

Federal Tort Claims Act Claims

The Federal Tort Claims Act generally waives the United States’ immunity from certain negligence claims involving federal employees, but the waiver has exceptions. The defendants argued that the discretionary-function exception barred the plaintiffs’ claims. That exception can apply when the challenged conduct involves judgment or choice and is grounded in public-policy considerations.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the individual employees violated a specific, mandatory Bureau of Prisons policy. The policy required staff to report immediately any knowledge, suspicion, or information concerning inmate sexual abuse. Because the alleged duty to report was mandatory rather than discretionary, the court held that the discretionary-function exception did not bar the plaintiffs’ claims against the United States. It therefore denied the motion to dismiss those Federal Tort Claims Act claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court noted that the moving defendants had challenged the Federal Tort Claims Act claims only on jurisdictional grounds, not on whether the complaint plausibly stated the three tort claims. The opinion accordingly did not decide whether those claims ultimately would succeed on their elements.

Disposition

The court granted the motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs’ Bivens claims against Reid, West, Harris, Collier, Hill, and Lewis, and denied the motion as to the plaintiffs’ Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States. The opinion separately stated that the unidentified John Doe defendants would be dismissed seven days after the opinion unless they were identified and served; the conclusion did not state that this dismissal had already occurred. Judge P. Castel signed the opinion on March 27, 2022.