Jackson v. United States
- Loretta Preska
- 1:16-cv-04792
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 27
In Jackson v. United States, Judge Preska denied Jackson’s request to erase his sentence, finding procedural default and valid murder-based firearm convictions.
Raymond Jackson, whose motion challenging his sentence and two firearm convictions was denied; the United States, which opposed the motion.
What happened
In Jackson v. United States, Raymond Jackson asked the court to vacate his sentence under a federal law allowing prisoners to challenge unlawful sentences. He argued that his two firearm convictions were invalid because the murder-conspiracy offenses supporting them were not legally qualifying violent crimes after Supreme Court decisions invalidated part of the firearm statute.
The court held that Jackson had shown a valid reason for not raising this argument earlier because the legal challenge was not reasonably available when he was convicted. But he did not show that the alleged error affected his decision to plead guilty, and he did not claim factual innocence. The court also explained that both firearm convictions were based on substantive murder offenses as well as murder conspiracies.
Judge Preska denied Jackson’s motion. She ruled that intentional second-degree murder under New York law qualifies as a violent crime under the relevant firearm statute’s force-based definition, so both firearm convictions remained valid.
The detailed version
- Jackson v. United States · No. 1:16-cv-04792
- Loretta Preska
- Mar. 31, 2022
Background
Raymond Jackson moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The Government opposed the motion. Jackson had pleaded guilty in 1999 to conspiracy to murder George Ford and to two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The two firearm convictions involved the murders of Greg Hawkins and Sheila Berry. He received a total sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment, consisting of consecutive sentences of 120 months for the murder-conspiracy count, 60 months for one firearm count, and 240 months for the other firearm count.
The plea agreement identified both conspiracy to murder and murder in aid of racketeering as predicate offenses for each firearm conviction. The record showed that Jackson admitted during his plea hearing that he obtained guns, knew they would be used to kill the victims, and was present when the murders occurred. The remaining open counts were dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
Jackson’s Challenge
Jackson argued that the firearm convictions were invalid after the Supreme Court held that the residual clause of § 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague. He contended that conspiracy to murder does not qualify under the statute’s elements clause, which covers a felony that requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The parties agreed that conspiracy to murder is not a crime of violence under that clause.
The Government argued that Jackson’s challenge was procedurally defaulted because he did not raise it on direct appeal. Procedural default generally prevents collateral review of a claim that was not raised earlier, unless the defendant shows a legally sufficient reason for the omission and actual prejudice, or shows factual innocence.
Procedural Default
The court found that Jackson established cause for failing to raise the challenge earlier. When he was convicted in 1999, the constitutional argument against the residual clause was not reasonably available. The Supreme Court’s later decisions invalidating similar residual clauses, including the § 924(c) residual clause, supplied the legal basis for Jackson’s argument only years later.
The court nevertheless found that Jackson did not establish actual prejudice. For a guilty plea, he needed to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if the alleged legal error had been known. The court concluded that the record contained evidence supporting convictions for the substantive murders, which were valid predicate offenses even if conspiracy to murder was not. The Government had dismissed the murder charges as part of the plea agreement. Because the record supported the substantive murder predicates, the court found no reasonable probability that Jackson would have rejected the guilty plea. Jackson also did not claim actual innocence, and the court stated that his plea admissions would have prevented him from proving it.
Merits
The court alternatively considered the merits. It rejected Jackson’s argument that Count 77 rested only on conspiracy to murder. The indictment, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and sentencing record showed that Count 77 involved both the conspiracy to murder and the substantive murder of Greg Hawkins. Count 80 likewise involved both the conspiracy to murder and the substantive murder of Sheila Berry.
The court applied the categorical approach, which asks whether the minimum conduct required for the charged offense necessarily involves the use of physical force, rather than focusing only on the defendant’s particular conduct. It determined that the relevant offenses were intentional second-degree murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(1). Relying on Second Circuit precedent, the court held that intentional murder under New York law categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause.
Disposition
The court denied Jackson’s § 2255 motion. It directed the Clerk to close the related motions and the civil case, No. 16-cv-4792.
Read the full 27-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.