Glover v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Kimberly Glover challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability beginning December 1, 2016, based on scoliosis of the thoracic spine, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and social phobia. The administrative law judge found that these were severe impairments but did not meet or equal a listed impairment.

The administrative law judge determined that Glover had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her impairments—to perform light work with restrictions. She could frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; perform simple routine tasks without a strict production-rate pace; recall and execute simple instructions; avoid working with the general public; have occasional interaction with coworkers; and tolerate minor changes in the work setting and procedures. Because she had no past relevant work, the administrative law judge relied on vocational-expert testimony and found that a substantial number of jobs were available that she could perform. The administrative law judge therefore found that she was not disabled.

Arguments

Glover argued that the administrative law judge failed to account for her history of absences and did not properly evaluate vocational expert Edmond J. Calandra’s testimony. Calandra testified that an individual who was off task 11 percent of the workday, absent twice per month on an unscheduled basis, or unable to interact appropriately with coworkers on occasion would be unable to maintain gainful employment. Glover also argued that the administrative law judge did not give adequate weight to the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Christina Toba, or properly evaluate Glover’s statements about her symptoms.

The Commissioner maintained that the administrative law judge’s residual-functional-capacity finding was supported by the medical record, the medical opinions, Glover’s reported activities, and her improvement with treatment.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge adequately evaluated Dr. Toba’s opinion. The administrative law judge found that Dr. Toba’s medical-source statement was not supported by sufficient explanation or relevant medical evidence and was inconsistent with the record, including Glover’s outpatient treatment, improvement after treatment, and reported daily activities. The court also noted that other medical experts disagreed with Dr. Toba’s assessment and that the administrative law judge was permitted to resolve conflicts in the evidence.

The court rejected Glover’s argument that the administrative law judge’s findings of moderate limitations required a disability finding. Although one state-agency expert stated that Glover could not work more than six hours in an eight-hour workday, that expert also stated that she could perform unskilled work in a setting involving limited contact with others. The court noted that Glover did not argue that she could not work an equivalent schedule.

The court also concluded that the administrative law judge adequately considered Calandra’s testimony. An administrative law judge need not mention every piece of evidence if the decision provides a sufficient basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the correct legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the administrative law judge relied on the medical record, medical opinions, treatment history, reported improvement, and daily activities in determining that Glover could perform work with the stated restrictions.

Finally, the court rejected Glover’s challenge to the treatment of her subjective statements. It found that the administrative law judge considered Glover’s representations but examined inconsistencies between those statements and the medical opinions and the record as a whole.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. denied Plaintiff’s motion and granted Defendant’s motion. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate ECF Nos. 18 and 22. The opinion did not state that either motion was granted or denied with or without prejudice.