Wilkins v. Willner

Background

Leonard Donnell Wilkins, a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Vernon C. Bain Center, brought this action without a lawyer seeking damages for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights. He sued Evan Willner, an attorney from the Legal Aid Society who represented him in pending New York criminal matters; a prosecutor identified as “John Doe”; and Justice “Wade,” which the opinion says appears to refer to Justice Laura Ward.

Wilkins alleged that Willner interfered with a proposed bail payment by warning the person who intended to post bail that the person could be pursued for the unpaid balance if Wilkins failed to appear in court. Wilkins said bail was not posted and that he remained detained, where he was infected with COVID-19 twice. He also alleged that Willner urged him to accept an unfavorable plea agreement, failed to provide a felony arrest report, and waived his right to appear before the grand jury. Wilkins alleged that the prosecutor conspired with defense counsel to deprive him of the right to testify before the grand jury. He alleged that Justice Ward knowingly allowed those events to occur.

Wilkins sought $9 million from Willner, $1 million from the prosecutor, and $1 million from Justice Ward. He also asked that the attorneys be disbarred and criminally prosecuted and that Justice Ward step down from the bench.

Screening standard and legal framework

Because Wilkins sought damages for constitutional violations, the court treated his claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to allege that a person acting under state authority violated a right protected by the Constitution or federal law. The court screened the complaint under the statutes governing prisoner complaints filed without prepaying fees. Those statutes require dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek money from a defendant who is immune from that relief. The court also noted that it must dismiss claims over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

Claims against the judicial defendant

The court dismissed Wilkins’s claims against Justice Ward under absolute judicial immunity. This doctrine generally protects judges from damages claims based on acts taken as part of their judicial responsibilities, including acts related to individual cases before them. The court held that the challenged conduct involved Justice Ward’s handling of grand-jury proceedings and therefore fell within that protection. It also characterized the claims as frivolous under the prisoner-screening statute.

Claims against the prosecutor

The court dismissed the damages claims against the “John Doe” prosecutor under absolute prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors are protected from civil damages claims for conduct within their official duties that is closely connected to the judicial phase of a criminal case. The court held that the alleged conduct involving the grand-jury proceedings fell within that protected category and was therefore also frivolous for purposes of screening.

The court further explained in a footnote that, to the extent Wilkins sued the judicial and prosecutorial defendants in their official capacities for damages arising from the criminal proceedings, those claims were also barred by immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

Claims against defense counsel

The court dismissed the claims against Willner because Wilkins did not plausibly allege that Willner acted under color of state law. A private defense lawyer, including a public defender or Legal Aid attorney, generally is not a state actor when performing traditional defense functions in a criminal case. The court acknowledged Wilkins’s allegations that Willner collaborated with the prosecutor, including by waiving the grand-jury appearance and urging acceptance of the prosecutor’s plea offer. But it held that Wilkins had not plausibly alleged the concerted action or conspiracy necessary to make Willner a state actor for purposes of § 1983.

State-law claims and amendment

After dismissing all claims over which it had original federal jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Wilkins might have been asserting. The court also declined to give Wilkins permission to amend because the complaint gave no indication that its defects could be cured through amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed Wilkins’s § 1983 claims under the prisoner-screening statutes. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. It certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without prepaying fees. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.