Di Pompo v. Village of Brewster

Background

Di Pompo originally sued the Village of Brewster and Officer M. Mendelson. The case was removed from New York state court to federal court. In an earlier order, the court dismissed all claims except Di Pompo’s Fourth Amendment claim against Mendelson, which alleged that Mendelson pulled him over without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Village’s claims had already been dismissed.

Mendelson moved for reconsideration of the earlier order on two grounds: that he had not been properly served with the lawsuit, and that the court had incorrectly decided that Di Pompo adequately pleaded a Fourth Amendment violation.

Service of Process

The court reconsidered the service issue because its earlier order had not addressed Mendelson’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), which allows dismissal for insufficient service of process.

Di Pompo’s attorney stated that she personally delivered the summons and complaint to Michelle Chiudina, the Village’s clerk and treasurer, and that Chiudina said she was authorized to accept the papers for Mendelson. Chiudina’s sworn statement disputed that she had made that representation or was authorized to accept service for Mendelson.

The court held that Di Pompo had not made the required initial showing that Chiudina was Mendelson’s appointed agent for service under New York law. The fact that Chiudina and Mendelson were both Village employees did not establish that Mendelson had authorized her to accept service. Di Pompo also had not shown another valid method of service.

The deadline to serve Mendelson had passed. The court found no good cause for extending the deadline and declined to grant an extension without a request from Di Pompo. It therefore dismissed what remained of Di Pompo’s amended complaint against Mendelson without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(5).

Fourth Amendment Claim

The court denied reconsideration of its conclusion that Di Pompo had pleaded a Fourth Amendment claim. It explained that a traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and generally must be supported by reasonable suspicion—a specific, objective basis for suspecting that the person stopped violated the law.

The court rejected Mendelson’s argument that the stop was not a seizure merely because it resulted in traffic tickets or a summons. The court also found that the cases Mendelson cited did not establish that a traffic stop loses its character as a seizure when the stop leads only to a summons. Because Di Pompo alleged that the stop lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the court declined to dismiss that claim under Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns failure to state a legally sufficient claim.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Mendelson’s motion for reconsideration. It dismissed the complaint against Mendelson without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(5), declined to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(6), directed the clerk to terminate the motion, and closed the case. Judge Cathy Seibel also canceled the previously scheduled conference.