Dwyer v. Allbirds, Inc.

Background

Patricia Dwyer sued Allbirds, Inc., alleging that the company misleadingly marketed wool shoes as environmentally friendly and humane. The amended complaint sought damages and injunctive relief under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350, which address deceptive business practices and false advertising. It also asserted claims for breach of express warranty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. Dwyer sought to represent a class of people residing in New York who purchased the shoes.

Dwyer alleged that Allbirds advertised its shoes with statements including “Sustainability Meets Style,” “Low Carbon Footprint,” “Environmentally Friendly,” “Made with Sustainable Wool,” and “Our Sheep Live The Good Life.” She challenged Allbirds’s use of a life-cycle assessment tool and the Higg Material Sustainability Index to calculate carbon emissions, arguing that these methods did not account for all environmental effects of wool production. She also relied on a publication from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals describing alleged mistreatment in the wool industry and criticizing the scope of Allbirds’s animal-welfare certification and environmental claims.

Legal standard

Allbirds moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). At this stage, the court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true but did not accept legal conclusions. The complaint had to contain enough factual matter to make the claims plausible, rather than merely possible.

New York consumer-protection claims

The court held that Dwyer adequately alleged that Allbirds’s conduct was directed at consumers, but she did not plausibly allege that Allbirds’s statements were materially misleading to a reasonable consumer.

For the environmental claims, the court characterized Dwyer’s objections to the life-cycle assessment tool and the Higg Material Sustainability Index as criticisms of the methods used, not allegations that Allbirds falsely described those methods or falsely calculated the figures it reported. Allbirds disclosed the components of its carbon-footprint calculations and did not represent that the calculations included environmental effects such as land occupation, eutrophication, or all emissions from wool production. The court also concluded that Dwyer did not plausibly allege that Allbirds alone possessed the information she claimed it omitted, because her complaint relied on information discussed by researchers, advocacy organizations, industry sources, and a government committee.

For the animal-welfare claims, the court found that the humorous advertisements showing sheep did not make factual representations. It also held that general allegations about cruelty in the wool industry did not connect the alleged practices to the wool used by Allbirds. Dwyer’s criticisms of the ZQ Merino certification program concerned the program’s methods and scope, but did not plausibly allege that sheep at the particular farms supplying Allbirds were treated cruelly. Finally, the statement “Our Sheep Live The Good Life” was non-specific and subjective advertising puffery, meaning a generalized opinion or sales statement that a reasonable consumer would not treat as a factual promise.

The court therefore dismissed Dwyer’s claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350.

Other claims

The court dismissed the express-warranty claim because Dwyer did not identify particular statements that constituted express promises and did not adequately plead that she gave Allbirds the notice of breach required by New York law.

The fraud claim was dismissed because Dwyer did not plausibly plead a materially false statement or facts creating a strong inference that Allbirds intended to defraud her. The court also treated the claim as abandoned because Dwyer did not oppose Allbirds’s argument concerning fraudulent intent.

The unjust-enrichment claim was dismissed because Dwyer did not explain how it differed from her other claims and therefore appeared duplicative.

Leave to amend and disposition

Dwyer had already amended her complaint after receiving notice of Allbirds’s anticipated arguments and the court’s observations at a pre-motion conference. She did not request another amendment or identify additional facts that would cure the deficiencies. The court therefore declined to grant leave to amend on its own initiative.

The court granted Allbirds’s motion to dismiss, directed the Clerk to terminate the motion, and closed the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with prejudice or without prejudice.