Stinson v. Houslanger & Associates PLLC

Background

The court had previously granted summary judgment in part for Houslanger & Associates PLLC, Todd Houslanger, DEMI, LLC, Matthew Blake, Harry Torres, and Bryan C. Bryks. As relevant to this motion, the court previously concluded that punitive damages under New York General Business Law § 349 were not warranted because Stinson had provided no evidence that Defendants’ conduct came close to criminality. The court also granted summary judgment for Defendants on Stinson’s claim under Judiciary Law § 487, finding that she had provided no evidence that Defendants intended to deceive courts by filing time-barred lawsuits.

Stinson moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). That rule permits reconsideration only when the moving party shows an intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, clear error, or a need to prevent manifest injustice. The court described reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy that cannot be used to relitigate old issues, present new theories, obtain a second hearing on the merits, or substitute for an appeal.

Punitive Damages Under General Business Law § 349

Stinson argued that the court should have applied a “wanton disregard” standard when deciding whether punitive damages were available. The court rejected that argument because Stinson cited authorities that she had already cited in her summary-judgment opposition or that the court had already considered, and she did not show that the court had overlooked controlling decisions.

Stinson also argued that whether punitive damages were available was always a factual issue for a jury. The court disagreed. It explained that the trial court first decides whether punitive damages are legally recoverable in the particular case. Only if there is a reasonable basis for such an award do the questions whether damages should be awarded and their amount go to the jury. The court concluded that it had properly determined that punitive damages were not recoverable here.

Stinson further argued that the evidence she presented created a factual dispute about punitive damages. The court stated that she had directed it to that evidence in her original briefing and that the court had considered much of it in its earlier opinion. The fact that the earlier opinion did not expressly discuss all of that evidence in the punitive-damages section did not show that the court had overlooked controlling facts. The court found that Stinson disagreed with its conclusion but had not shown a basis for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).

Judiciary Law § 487

Stinson argued that the court had misunderstood Todd Houslanger’s testimony about whether his firm used the debt owner’s state of residency or the original creditor’s state of residency when determining the applicable limitations period. She also asked the court to revisit several decisions cited in her original briefing. The court concluded that these arguments sought to relitigate issues that had already been decided, which was not a proper basis for reconsideration.

Disposition

After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the record, and the relevant law, the court concluded that reconsideration was unwarranted. Judge J. Paul Oetken denied Stinson’s motion to reconsider the September 28, 2021 Opinion and Order and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion at Docket Number 187.