Heron v. Medrite Testing, L.L.C.

Background

Malika Heron sued her former employer, Medrite Testing, LLC, Christopher Schrier, and Jane Doe. She alleged that she was fired in retaliation for opposing sex- and gender-related harassment by coworker Samuel Rodriguez. Her claims arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Heron alleged that Rodriguez repeatedly asked about her love life, referred to her and women generally as “bitches,” pushed her, and called her a “bitch.” She pushed back and told him to stop touching and berating her. Heron did not allege that she reported Rodriguez’s conduct to anyone before her termination. She alleged that she asked “Manager David” whether a coworker would be fired if she complained, but she did not identify the coworker or the conduct. She also alleged that, after being told she was being fired, she said that Rodriguez had touched her and asked whether he would be fired.

Claims and legal standard

The First Amended Complaint asserted six claims: a Title VII retaliation claim against Medrite; New York State Human Rights Law retaliation and aiding-and-abetting claims; New York City Human Rights Law retaliation and aiding-and-abetting claims; and a New York City Human Rights Law vicarious-liability claim against Medrite.

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On such a motion, the court accepts well-pleaded facts as true but requires enough factual content to make liability plausible.

Title VII retaliation claim

The court dismissed Count I, the Title VII retaliation claim against Medrite. A retaliation claim requires protected activity—action opposing discrimination prohibited by Title VII—employer awareness of that activity, a materially adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

The court held that Heron did not allege protected activity before her termination. Her question about whether a coworker would be fired if she complained did not identify a particular employee or specific workplace conduct. Her later statements about Rodriguez were made after she had already been told that her employment was terminated. The court therefore concluded that the termination could not have been retaliation for those statements.

State and city retaliation claims

The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state and city claims instead of sending them to state court. It did so because the claims arose from the same facts, were not legally complex, and appeared to fail for the same reason as the federal claim.

The court granted the motion to dismiss Count II, the New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claim. It applied the same basic retaliation standard and held that Heron did not allege protected activity before her termination.

The court dismissed Count IV, the New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim. Although the city law uses a more lenient standard for the type of retaliatory act required, the court held that Heron still did not allege that she was fired for engaging in protected activity.

Aiding-and-abetting claims

The court dismissed Counts III and V, the aiding-and-abetting claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws. Those claims require an underlying discriminatory or retaliatory violation and allegations that the defendant actually participated in it. Because Heron did not state a viable retaliation or other primary violation, the court found no conduct for the defendants to have aided or abetted. The court also stated that Heron had not alleged that Medrite or Schrier shared the discriminatory or retaliatory intent of a primary actor.

Vicarious-liability claim

The court dismissed Count VI, the New York City Human Rights Law vicarious-liability claim against Medrite. The court explained that such liability requires an unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory act by an employee or agent under circumstances identified by the statute. Because Heron had not adequately alleged discrimination or retaliation, the court held that there was no unlawful conduct to which vicarious liability could attach.

Disposition

Judge McMahon granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. The court dismissed Counts I through VI and directed the Clerk of Court to remove the motion from the list of open motions and close the case. The opinion’s conclusion states that the motion “is dismissed,” but the decision repeatedly states that the motion is granted and describes the claims as dismissed.