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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Apr. 26, 2022

Medina v. Victoria's Secret & Co.

Judge
Vyskocil
Docket
1:21-cv-06983
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
6
Civil ProcedurePro Se
In one sentence

In Medina v. Victoria’s Secret, Judge Vyskocil granted Medina’s motion to set aside the entry of default on the defendants’ counterclaim.

Who this affects

The ruling affects Michael Medina and the two defendants, Victoria’s Secret & Co. and Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Management LLC. It removes the entry of default against Medina on the defendants’ counterclaim; the opinion does not decide the merits of the counterclaim.

What happened

In Medina v. Victoria’s Secret, Michael Medina, who was representing himself, did not respond to the defendants’ counterclaim after the court directed him to do so. The Clerk entered a default against him, and Medina later said he had not received the relevant documents before filing an answer.

The court found good cause to set aside the default. It determined that Medina’s failure to respond was not deliberate, that removing the default would not cause the defendants meaningful harm beyond delay, and that the lack of a detailed defense was not decisive at this stage.

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil granted Medina’s motion to set aside the entry of default and asked the Clerk to vacate that entry. The court also stated that it would schedule an initial pretrial conference.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Medina v. Victoria's Secret & Co. · No. 1:21-cv-06983
Judge
Vyskocil
Date
Apr. 26, 2022

Background

Michael Medina, who was proceeding without a lawyer, filed the lawsuit on August 19, 2021. Victoria’s Secret & Co. and Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Management LLC answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim against Medina. After two months without action by either side, the court ordered Medina to answer or respond to the counterclaim and directed the defendants to seek a default judgment if he did not do so.

Medina did not respond, and the Clerk issued a certificate of default. Medina later sent a letter stating that he had not known that a counterclaim had been filed and had not received documents concerning it. The defendants responded that the counterclaim had been properly served by first-class mail. Medina then filed an answer denying the counterclaim’s allegations.

Legal standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of default for “good cause.” Courts generally disfavor defaults and prefer resolving disputes on their merits. In deciding whether good cause exists, the court considers whether the default was willful, whether setting it aside would prejudice the opposing party, and whether the defaulting party has presented a potentially meritorious defense. No single factor automatically controls, although willfulness receives the most weight.

Court’s analysis

The court concluded that Medina’s default was not caused by egregious or deliberate conduct. Medina said he was unaware of the order and the counterclaim, and he had since answered the counterclaim. The court also found no prejudice to the defendants because the case was at an early stage, no evidence had been lost, discovery would not be more difficult, and the delay had not created a greater opportunity for fraud.

Although Medina’s letter did not identify specific defenses, the court noted that he had answered the counterclaim and denied its allegations. The court explained that, because Medina was representing himself, it had to read his submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggested. It concluded that the absence of a detailed meritorious defense was not decisive under these circumstances.

Ruling

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil granted Medina’s motion to set aside the entry of default. The court directed the Clerk to vacate the entry of default. The court stated that an initial pretrial conference would be set by separate order and reminded Medina that, unless he consented to electronic service, court communications would be sent by mail.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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