Kellier v. Ross

Background

Joshua Kellier, proceeding without a lawyer, sued New York County Criminal Court Judge Neil Ross, New York County Supreme Court Administrative Judge Ellen Biben, and New York County Criminal Court Clerk Nicole Beckford. He alleged that events during his state criminal proceedings violated federal constitutional rights, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and state law. The court also interpreted parts of the complaint as challenging Kellier’s custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the federal statute allowing certain custody challenges.

Kellier’s allegations included that Ross ordered or addressed a competency examination, threatened contempt when Kellier challenged that order, and told him to speak through his lawyer. Kellier alleged that Biben also ordered a competency examination, prevented him from recording a proceeding, and told him not to speak directly to the judge. He alleged that Beckford refused to accept a motion to disqualify Ross at the clerk’s office and told him to file it in open court. The complaint also referred to alleged interference with recorded videos and property, efforts to obtain a confession, double jeopardy, cruel treatment, and violations of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd. The requested relief was unclear but appeared to include money damages and broad orders involving the state criminal case.

Reasons for Dismissal

The court first ruled that the complaint violated Rule 8 because it was lengthy, confusing, repetitive, and did not provide a short and plain statement showing that Kellier was entitled to relief.

The court separately applied absolute judicial immunity. Judges are generally immune from damages lawsuits for actions taken as part of their judicial responsibilities. The court concluded that Kellier’s claims against Ross and Biben arose from their handling of his criminal matters and that he alleged no facts showing that either judge acted outside judicial responsibilities or jurisdiction. The court therefore dismissed the claims against Ross and Biben under that doctrine.

The court also concluded that Beckford’s alleged refusal to accept the disqualification motion and direction to file it in open court were actions connected to the judicial process and consistent with established court practice. It therefore dismissed Kellier’s claims against Beckford under absolute judicial immunity as well.

The court dismissed Kellier’s requests for orders interfering with his pending state criminal proceeding under the rule requiring federal courts generally not to interfere with ongoing state criminal cases. Kellier had not alleged the special circumstances—such as bad faith, harassment, or serious and immediate irreparable injury—needed for such intervention.

The court treated Kellier’s custody allegations as a request for relief under Section 2241. Although a person released on bail or on personal recognizance can qualify as being “in custody” for this purpose, the court held that a state criminal defendant must first use available state-court remedies, including available state habeas proceedings and appeals. Because Kellier did not show that he had done so, the court dismissed the custody claims without prejudice.

The court also dismissed any claims under Section 2000dd because that statute applies to people in the custody or physical control of the United States government, which the court found did not describe Kellier’s allegations. It dismissed any claims under the Convention Against Torture because that treaty does not provide a private right to sue in federal court.

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over any state-law claims Kellier might be asserting.

Disposition

The court dismissed Kellier’s claims under Sections 1983 and 1981 based on absolute judicial immunity. It dismissed his requests for injunctive relief under the rule requiring federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings. It dismissed his custody claims without prejudice, declined supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims, and denied leave to amend because the court found that the complaint’s defects could not be corrected by amendment.

The court denied Kellier’s request for the court to seek volunteer counsel as moot. It also ruled that no certificate of appealability would issue and denied his fee-waiver status for an appeal after certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.