Latouche v. Dr. John Hammer

Background

Valery Latouche, who was incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brought this action without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He asserted claims concerning medical care he received while detained at Rockland County Jail and while in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. He also challenged the denial of a post-conviction motion by the Rockland County Court. The court said the amended complaint could also be read to assert state-law claims.

The court had previously allowed Latouche to proceed without prepaying the filing fees. Because he was a prisoner proceeding without prepayment of fees and sued governmental entities or an employee of one, the court screened the amended complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That screening requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, legally insufficient, seek money from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Claims Against Rockland County Jail

The court dismissed all claims against Rockland County Jail because a jail is not a separate legal entity that can be sued. The court explained that claims involving the jail had to be brought against Rockland County, which Latouche had already named as a defendant.

Claims Against Rockland County

Latouche alleged that, while he was a pretrial detainee in 2005, he was prescribed Remeron and Atrax. He alleged that a doctor diagnosed him with gynecomastia in May 2005 as a result of taking Remeron and referred him for a biopsy. The court held that any Section 1983 claim based on those events accrued in 2005, when Latouche knew of the injury, and was subject to New York’s three-year limitations period. Because he filed this action in 2022, the court dismissed those Section 1983 claims as time-barred.

The court also dismissed any state-law claims arising from the 2005 medication events as untimely. It discussed New York’s two-and-a-half-year medical-malpractice limitations period and stated that it was unaware of another possible state-law theory with a limitations period long enough to make a suit filed 17 years after the injury timely.

Latouche also alleged that Rockland County had a policy or pattern that led the Rockland County Court and the district attorney’s office to apply New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 440.10(3)(c) in a way that prevented challenges to his conviction. The court held that a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 only when its own policy, custom, or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation. It rejected this theory because Rockland County does not control decisions by judges in New York’s state court system and has no role in training or supervising those judges.

The court further held that the claim improperly sought federal review and rejection of a state-court decision. Applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prevents a federal district court from acting as an appeals court over a state-court judgment, the court dismissed the claims arising from the state court’s use of the procedural bar in Section 440.10(3)(c) for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction.

John Morley and Service

The court did not dismiss the claims against John Morley in this order. Because Latouche had permission to proceed without prepaying fees, the court directed the Clerk of Court to issue a summons and provide the necessary papers to the U.S. Marshals Service for service on Morley. The court extended the time for service until 90 days after the summons was issued. It also required Latouche to notify the court in writing if his address changed.

Disposition

Judge Cathy Seibel dismissed the claims against Rockland County Jail because it lacked the capacity to be sued. She dismissed Latouche’s claims against Rockland County as time-barred and for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The court ordered issuance and service of a summons for John Morley. It also certified under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal.