Chance v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP
- Laura Swain
- 1:22-cv-03314
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Chance v. Selip & Stylianou, Judge Swain found the complaint insufficient but granted 60 days to amend.
Tyvaris S. Chance received an opportunity to amend his complaint within 60 days, while Selip & Stylianou, LLP was not required to respond to a served complaint because no summons issued.
What happened
In Chance v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP, Tyvaris S. Chance, representing himself, sued Selip & Stylianou under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. He alleged that the firm sent him letters about a $4,448.16 debt and threatened legal action, causing him emotional distress.
The court found that receiving notice of a possible civil lawsuit did not amount to harassment under the debt-collection law. It also found that Chance had not provided enough facts to support his other debt-collection allegations, identity-theft, constitutional, or Truth in Lending Act claims.
Judge Swain granted Chance 60 days to file an amended complaint with more facts. The court did not issue a summons and denied fee-waiver status for an appeal, stating that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- Chance v. Selip & Stylianou, LLP · No. 1:22-cv-03314
- Laura Swain
- May 16, 2022
Background
Tyvaris S. Chance, who was representing himself, brought a case under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), a federal law regulating debt-collection practices. He alleged that Selip & Stylianou, LLP, a debt collector, sent him a December 8, 2021 letter about a $4,448.16 debt allegedly owed to Citibank, N.A. The letter explained how to dispute the debt and stated that the firm had been authorized to seek a state-court remedy if payment was not received.
Chance wrote that he refused to pay the alleged debt and later claimed that Selip’s January 27, 2022 letter used abusive language, falsely suggested it came from an attorney, and threatened state-court action. He alleged that he suffered severe emotional distress. His filings also referred to several provisions of the FDCPA, a federal criminal identity-theft statute, the Fourth Amendment, and the Truth in Lending Act, but generally did not provide facts explaining how those laws were violated.
Court’s analysis
Because Chance had been allowed to proceed without paying filing fees, the court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The court explained that it must dismiss a fee-waived complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, seeks relief from an immune defendant, or falls outside the court’s jurisdiction. Self-represented pleadings are read liberally, but they still must provide enough facts to make a claim plausible.
The court treated the alleged threat of a state-court lawsuit as the main FDCPA claim. It held that a letter notifying a person of a possible civil lawsuit over an unpaid debt does not, by itself, violate the FDCPA’s ban on conduct whose natural consequence is harassment, oppression, or abuse. The letter did not use obscene or profane language, threaten violence or public humiliation, or involve repetitive communications. The court also found that the exhibits’ citations to other FDCPA provisions were unsupported by facts showing a violation.
The court further held that the identity-theft criminal statute does not provide a private right to sue. The Fourth Amendment claim could not proceed against Selip because Selip was a private actor, while the Constitution regulates government conduct. The Truth in Lending Act allegations also failed because Chance did not identify conduct violating that statute, and any claim concerning Citibank’s extension of credit could not be brought against Selip, the only named defendant.
Disposition
The court granted Chance leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days. The amended complaint must replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and must provide facts identifying the relevant people, events, dates, locations, injuries, and requested relief. The court stated that if Chance did not comply and could not show good cause, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. No summons would issue at that time.
The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Chance permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the order.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.