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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled May 31, 2022

Stalling v. T3 Trading Group LLC

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:22-cv-02296
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
6
EmploymentCivil ProcedurePro Se
In one sentence

In Stalling v. T3 Trading Group, Chief Judge Swain dismissed the federal discrimination claims and declined to hear the state-law claims.

Who this affects

David Stalling’s Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim. His state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice after the court declined supplemental jurisdiction; T3 Trading Group, LLC prevailed in this action.

What happened

In Stalling v. T3 Trading Group, David Stalling alleged that T3 Trading Group, LLC did not move forward with his trader application because he is Black. He brought claims under Title VII and Section 1981.

The court found that Stalling’s allegations—that he submitted identification showing his race and was not hired—did not plausibly show race discrimination. It dismissed both federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice.

Chief Judge Swain also declined to give Stalling another opportunity to amend because the court found no indication that another amendment could fix the problems. The court denied him permission to appeal without paying fees after certifying that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Stalling v. T3 Trading Group LLC · No. 1:22-cv-02296
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
May 31, 2022

Background

David Stalling, representing himself and proceeding without paying the filing fee, applied to be a trader with T3 Trading Group, LLC. After a phone interview, he was directed to submit a check for $245 for Financial Industry Regulatory Authority exam-registration fees, identification, and proof of address. He alleged that he submitted his identification, which identified him as Black, but did not allege whether he submitted the check or proof of address. He was told that the trading position depended on passing two exams. On September 8, 2020, the company’s Director of Compliance told him that his application would not move forward but gave no reason.

The court noted that documents attached to Stalling’s original complaint had reflected T3’s position that he was applying to become a member of the trading group rather than an employee. An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notice also stated that the charge was being closed because Stalling was not in an employment relationship with T3. Because those documents were not attached to the amended complaint, the court assumed at this stage that T3 was a potential employer, as Stalling alleged.

Title VII claim

The court screened the amended complaint under the statute governing complaints filed by people who cannot pay filing fees. It was required to dismiss a complaint that was frivolous, malicious, failed to state a claim for relief, or sought relief from an immune defendant. The court also explained that a self-represented complaint must contain enough factual detail to make the claim plausible, not merely possible.

For a Title VII employment-discrimination claim, the plaintiff must plausibly allege an adverse employment action and facts showing that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the decision. The court held that Stalling’s allegations did not directly show race discrimination and did not create a plausible inference of discrimination indirectly. The fact that his partially completed application did not move forward after he submitted materials from which his race could have been learned was insufficient without additional facts. The court therefore found that the amended complaint failed to state a Title VII claim.

Section 1981 claim

For a race-discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the court explained that a plaintiff must allege membership in a racial minority, an intent to discriminate based on race, and discrimination involving an activity protected by the statute. The plaintiff must also allege that, without the plaintiff’s race, the defendant would not have caused the loss of the protected right.

The court held that Stalling’s allegations that he submitted some application materials, including identification showing his race, and was not hired were insufficient to create a plausible inference that T3 discriminated against him because of race. The court therefore found that the amended complaint failed to state a Section 1981 claim.

Amendment and state-law claims

The court declined to give Stalling another opportunity to amend. It explained that he had already been given an opportunity to correct the deficiencies and that the amended complaint gave no indication that further amendment could cure them.

After dismissing the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—in the early stage of the case. The state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice to Stalling’s bringing them in an appropriate forum.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It declined under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The court also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Stalling permission to appeal without paying filing fees. The order was signed by Chief United States District Judge Laura Taylor Swain.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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