Rapp v. Fowler

Background

Anthony Rapp renewed his motion to remand, asking the court to return the action to state court for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The defendant, Kevin Spacey Fowler, had removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1) and 1441. Diversity jurisdiction generally permits federal courts to hear qualifying cases between citizens of different states when more than $75,000 is at stake.

Rapp did not dispute that he was a citizen of New York. He argued that Fowler was domiciled in the United Kingdom, not Maryland, and therefore was not a citizen of a different state for diversity purposes. Rapp characterized Fowler’s presence in Maryland as connected to his work on House of Cards and argued that Fowler intended to leave Maryland after that work ended.

Legal Standard

For diversity jurisdiction, an individual must be both a United States citizen and domiciled in a state. Domicile means the person’s true fixed home and principal establishment, together with the intention to return there when absent. Diversity must exist both when the action was filed and when it was removed. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving it, ordinarily by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that the fact is more likely true than not.

Rapp argued that Fowler faced a heightened burden because a prior domicile is presumed to continue. The court explained that the cases Rapp cited involved personal jurisdiction under New York law, not federal diversity jurisdiction. The court did not decide whether a heightened standard applied because it found that Fowler established Maryland domicile under either the preponderance standard or the more demanding clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.

Evidence and Analysis

The court credited Fowler’s testimony at the May 26, 2022 evidentiary hearing. Fowler testified that he had been physically present in Maryland more than anywhere else beginning as early as 2012 and decided in 2014 to make Maryland his home, regardless of whether House of Cards continued. He purchased the Maryland home he had been renting and later purchased a Baltimore home in early 2017, which he testified had been his primary residence since the purchase.

The court also relied on evidence that Fowler used personal funds to purchase the Baltimore home, sold a residence in the Los Angeles area shortly before that purchase, filed several years of Maryland resident tax returns, and had veterinary records showing continuing treatment for his dog at a Baltimore animal hospital from 2017 through 2021. The court said these facts reinforced Fowler’s testimony about his residence, ownership, taxes, living arrangements, and other connections to Maryland.

Rapp argued that Fowler’s property transactions were held through entities rather than directly in Fowler’s name, and challenged the address information on his Maryland tax forms. The court rejected those arguments, finding no reason to doubt that the entities held property purchased with Fowler’s funds for his benefit and no reason to believe Fowler knew the county-address distinction on the tax forms was significant.

Rapp also relied on Fowler’s travel to the United Kingdom, ownership of an apartment in London, physical presence there, and comments in British media describing London as his home. The court found those facts consistent with Fowler’s professional activities and international travel, and credited Fowler’s explanation that the media comments were connected to his public role at the Old Vic theatre. The court further found Rapp’s judicial-estoppel argument—an argument that a party should not take inconsistent positions after a court adopted an earlier position—unsupported because Rapp did not show an inconsistent representation or judicial adoption of one.

Ruling

The court found that Fowler’s true fixed home and principal establishment, and the place to which he intended to return, was Maryland both when the action was filed on September 9, 2020, and when it was removed on November 13, 2020. It concluded that subject-matter jurisdiction existed and that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

The court therefore denied Rapp’s renewed motion to remand in all respects. The opinion states that its findings were findings of fact and conclusions of law.